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Abstract
Rutkowski  seeks to  determine the main factors behind  e  The unfriendly  business  environment,  reflected  by a
poor labor market outcomes in  Bulgaria. Unemployment  low rate of new firm formation,  and a  relatively small
in Bulgaria  is high and of long duration.  The  small and medium enterprise sector.
accumulation  of the unemployment  stock has been  o Labor market rigidities,  including excessive  hiring
caused by relatively  high inflows  into unemployment  and firing costs.
coupled with  limited outflows. These  features of the  o Skill  and spatial  mismatches brought about by
Bulgarian labor market are typical of other transition  enterprise  restructuring,  as well as low skills and
economies  in  Central  Europe and exploring their sources  marginalization  of the long-term unemployed  who
is of broad  interest.  Rutkowski focuses on determinants  cannot successfully  compete for new jobs.
of and constraints  to job creation.  He uses data on job  The author recommends a three pronged strategy to
creation and job destruction  from a survey of  improve  labor market  performance:  (1) removing
employment  in all registered  firms.  He finds that the  bureaucratic  constraints  to entry and expansion  of firms;
source of large inflows  into unemployment  is intensive  (2) enhancing labor market flexibility  through lowering
enterprise  restructuring  associated  with a high pace of  hiring and firing costs; and  (3)  Improving the educational
job reallocation.  However,  job creation falls short of job  system so as to equip workers  with broad  and portable
destruction.  Three main factors account  for the limited  skills.
job creation  and hiring,  and thus for low outflows from
unemployment:
This paper-a product of the Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort
in the region to examine labor market performance and its contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction.  Copies
of the paper are  available  free  from  the World  Banik,  1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact Jan
Rutkowski, room H7-170, telephone 202-478-4569,  fax 202-477-3387, email address jrutkowski@worldbank.org. Policy
Research  Working Papers are  also posted  on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  April 2003.  (62 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper  Senes disseminates the findings of work in  progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if  the presentations  are  less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.




This paper was prepared  for the  Bulgaria  Poverty Assessment,  which  was  led by Dena
Ringold.INTRODUCTION
The  objective  of this  paper  is  to  examine  possible  factors  behind  weak  labor
market  outcomes  in  Bulgaria.  Is  high  and  rising  unemployment  a  result  of poor
macroeconomic  performance  and  depressed  demand?  Bad  investment  climate  and
unfavorable  business environment?  Labor market policies and regulations detrimental  to
flexibility  and  inhibiting  job  creation?  Or  is  high  unemployment  due  to  supply  side
factors,  such a skill mismatches  and lack of labor mobility?
The paper  finds that high unemployment  in Bulgaria can be largely  accounted for
by intensive  enterprise  restructuring  coupled  with  unsatisfactory  business  environment
and  some labor market rigidities.  An additional  factor  is limited capacity  on the part  of
the unemployed  to  benefit  from  opportunities  created  by high job  turnover due  to skill
mismatches.  An  enabling business environment,  greater labor  market  flexibility and the
educational  system  better suited to the needs of the labor market  are thus  key for better
labor  market  outcomes  and  - more  broadly  - for  Bulgaria's  greater  global
competitiveness.
The paper is organized  as  follows.  The first section  sets the stage by presenting
the problem:  the low level of the utilization of labor resources  in Bulgaria and substantial
labor  market  slack.  The  second  section  looks  at  possible  factors  explaining  high
unemployfnent:  macroeconomic  developments  and  business  environment,  enterprise
restructuring,  skill mismatches,  and labor market regulations.  The  final  section presents
main conclusions and policy implications.
I.  HIGH AND  RISING UNEMPLOYMENT
Unemployment  in Bulgaria  is high  and rising.  The  duration  of unemployment
spells tends to be long,  and consequently,  the share of long-term unemployment  has been
very  high,  even  by  the  standards  of transition  economies.  In  2001  unemployment
approached  20 percent, rising from a relatively low level of 12 percent in  1998  (Table 1).
Over  60  percent  of the  unemployed  have  been jobless  for more  than  one  year.  Highunemployment  is just  one  symptom  of the  labor  market  stagnation.  The  labor  force
participation  rate  has  been  low  and  declining  and  as  a  result  the  employment-to-
population  ratio  - the summnary  measure of the utilization of labor resources - reached  its
lowest level since the beginning of transition in 2001.
Tabllel  Labor force participation, employment and unemployment,  1995-20O0i
(percent)
1995  1996  1997  1998  11999  2000  2001
Labor force participation
rate  52.2  52.5  51.9  51.6  50.2  49.8  50.4
Employment rate  44.0  45.4  44.8  45.3  43.1  41.7  40.6
Unemployment  rate  15.7  13.5  13.7  12.2  14.1  16.3  19.4
Share  of  long  term
unemployment  67.5  65.7  62.2  63.9  58.7  63.7
Notes:
1.  June data
2. Labor force participation rate = (Employed + Unemployed)/Population  aged 15+
3. Employment rate = Employed/Population  aged  15+
4. Unemployment  rate = Unemployed/Labor force
5.  Long-term  unemployment = duration of unemployment is one year or longer (including unknown duration).
Source:  Employment and Unemployment,  various years,  NSI.
Low level of utilization of  labor resources
The pattern of low employment prevailing  in Bulgaria is  similar to that observed
in other high unemployment transition economies  (e.g.  Rutkowski,  2002).  Its distinctive
features include low employment of prime age men, relatively high employment of prime
age women, and low labor force participation  of younger and older workers.
The employment  rate  among  prime  age  men  in  Bulgaria  is  substantially  lower
than  the  OECD  average.  In  Bulgaria  only  70  of the men  aged  25-54  are  employed,
compared  with  close to  90  percent  in  the  OECD  (Table  2).  This  20 percentage  point
differential illustrates best the degree of underutilization of labor resources in Bulgaria.  It
directly translates  into  lower output and higher poverty.  High unemployment among the
prime age  men  is one, although  a dominant,  reason  for the  low employment  rate.  The
other reason is relatively low labor  force participation  of prime age man, likely to reflect
to so called "discouraged  worker"  effect.  Many working  age men have  ceased looking
for a job because their efforts to  find one have proved  futile and they no longer believe
- 2 -that they will succeed in finding a new job.  Thus, not only do fewer prime age men have
jobs in Bulgaria than in the OECD, but also fewer of them look for a job.
In  strong  contrast,  the  employment  rate  among  prime  age women  is  relatively
high  in  Bulgaria,  despite  the  high  unemployment  rate.  Two-thirds  of the  prime  age
women  are  employed  in  Bulgaria,  which  is  somewhat  higher  than  in OECD.  This  is
because of the high female  labor force participation  rate - 81  percent in Bulgaria  against
68 percent  in the OECD  - which offsets the effect  of high unemployment.  Interestingly,
the total female employment rate in Bulgaria is virtually as high as the male one, which is
in contrast  to  OECD  countries,  where  employment  among  men is  substantially  higher
than among women.  Thus  high economic  activity of Bulgarian women  compensates,  to
some extent, the relatively low economic  activity of men.
Another facet of underutilization  of labor resources in Bulgaria is low labor force
participation,  and  consequently  the  low  employment  rate,  of young  and  older  workers.
Only  one-fifth  of young  (up  to  24  years  of age)  persons  are  employed  in  Bulgaria,
compared  with close to one-half in the OECD.  Similarly, less  than one-fourth of older
workers  (55  to 64)  are  employed  in Bulgaria,  compared  with slightly below one-half in
the OECD.  This reflects  labor market slack in Bulgaria,  but probably also cultural norms
as well  as relatively lax  rules  governing  the  award of various  non-work  social  benefits,
e.g. disability pensions.  Notwithstanding the reasons, low employment among  young and
older workers implies unutilized potential and negatively  affects the standards of living.
- 3 -Table 2  Unemployment, Babor force participation  and employment  rates by age and
gender:  B3relgaria and OECD
All workers  Men  Women





rate  20.0  39.0  17.5  18.8  34.9  16.5  19.4  34.9  16.5  19.4
Labor  force
participation
rate  63.2  34.5  82.6  29.2  34.7  84.7  41.6  34.2  80.6  18.1
Employment
rate  50.6  21.0  68.1  23.7  19.8  69.1  33.9  22.3  67.2  14.6
OECD  (1999)
Unemployment
rate  6.4  11.8  5.4  5.2  11.7  4.9  5.6  11.9  6.1  4.6
Labor  force
participation
rate  70.4  53.0  80.3  51.6  57 8  93.0  64.5  48.0  67.8  39.4
Employment
rate  65.9  46.7  75.9  48.9  51.1  88.5  60.8  42.3  63.6  37.6
Source:
Bulgara:  Labor Force Survey, June 2001; Bank staff calculations.
OECD:  Employment  Outlook, 2000.
A particularly worrisome  feature of Bulgarian unemployment  is its long duration.
An average  (median) unemployed person looks for a job for about 2  years, which  implies
a  considerable  private  and  social  cost.'  Usually,  long-term  unemployment  leads  to
poverty  and social  exclusion,  and this tends  to  further undermine  chances  to find  a new
job.  Long  duration  of unemployment  spells  indicates  a  stagnant  labor  market,  where
chances to escape  unemployment  are limited.  On  this count Bulgaria scores  worse than
most of transition economies  of CEE, even  those characterized  by a comparable  level of
unemployment.  For example, the share  of long-term  unemployment  in Bulgaria (which
exceeds  60  percent)  is  higher  than  in  Lithuania,  Poland  and  Slovakia  (where  it is  at
around  50  percent),  which  all  are  high  unemployment  countries.  The  majority  of
Bulgarian  unemployed  are marginalized,  facing poor labor market prospects and the high
risk of- possibly persistent - poverty.
-4  -Largeflows into and low outflowsfrom unemployment
Labor  market  prospects  are  best  depicted  by  the  so  called  transition  matrixes,
which show estimated probabilities that workers move across  different labor force states,
such  as  employment  and  unemployment.  Large  labor  flows  between  employment  and
unemployment  indicate  a dynamic  labor market,  where  there  is  a lot of both  firing  and
hiring.  Many  workers lose  their jobs, but they find  it relatively  easy to find  a new  one,
thus their unemployment spells tend to be short.  In contrast, limited labor flows point to
a stagnant market,  where few workers lose their jobs, but those who become unemployed
have  little chances  to find new  work.  In  such a case,  unemployment  is a stagnant  pool,
workers  tend to  stay jobless  for a long time, with their  chances  to find  a job  gradually
declining, often up to the point they become detached  from the labor market.
At first sight, it may seem that the labor market in Bulgaria is in a state of flux, as
there are considerable movements  across  labor force states  taking place over a one year
period (Table 3).2
1  This refers to the duration of completed unemployment spells, which on average  are twice the
duration of uncompleted spells (which are reported by official statistical  sources).
2  The analysis of labor flows  draws on Kotzeva (2002).
- 5 -Table 3  Tlransition probabilities across labor force states
(percentage of initial population)
Panel A
March, 2000  March,  2001
Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
Employed  83.4  9.3  7.3
Unemployed  22.1  37.4  40.5
Inactive  4.4  3.6  92.1
Panel B
March, 2000  June, 2001
Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
Employed  96.3  1.5  2.3
Unemployed  11.0  74.7  14.3
Inactive  2.7  3.3  94.0
Note: Yearly transition probabilities were calculated based on a
retrospective question in the March  2001  survey (N=2253).
Quarterly transition probabilities were calculated based on a
panel consisting of persons who were covered by two consecutive
waves of the survey (N=23000).  See Annex  1A for details.
Source: Kotzeva (2002) using LFS data.
Upon closer inspection it tums out that these considerable  labor flows in fact point to
a depressed labor market.  One witnesses negative dynamics,  characterized by:
o  large flows from employment to unemployment;
o  limited outflows from unemployment to jobs;
o  substantial  flows from unemployment to inactivity.
These  labor  flows  explain  rising  unemployment  and  the  declining  labor  force
participation  rate.  Large  inflows into  unemployment  are  not matched by proportionate
outflows.  About  9 percent  of workers  lost their jobs  in 2000  and became  unemployed.
This  proportion  is  high  even by standards  of transition  economies  of CEE,  where  the
annual  inflow rate  into  unemployment  usually does  not exceed  5 to  6 percent.  At the
same  time,  outflows  from  unemployment  to  jobs  are  in  the  lower  end  of the  range
characteristic  of transition  economies,  and very low by the standards  of dynamic  market
- 6 -economies.  In  Bulgaria  only 22  percent  of the  unemployed  found  a job within  a year,
compared  with about  35  percent  in Poland.  Thus, the  prima facie  reasons  behind high
and rising unemployment  in Bulgaria is high inflows  into unemployment, which coincide
with low  outflows  from unemployment  to work.  This  is  in contrast  to the model of a
genuinely dynamic  labor market,  where high inflows into unemployment  are matched by
high outflows from unemployment to jobs.
Large  flows  from  unemployment  to  inactivity  indicate  a  substantial  "discouraged
worker"  effect.  Many unemployed  in Bulgaria  cease looking  for  a job,  discouraged  by
the lack of job opportunities.  The  scale of this effect  is startling:  as much as 40 percent
of the unemployed  withdraw  from the  labor force within one  year.3 This is much more
than in other high unemployment  transition  economies of CEE.  For example,  in Poland
and Lithuania,  only about  15  percent of the unemployed  withdraw  from the labor force
within  a  year,  and  this  proportion  is  still  smaller  in  Slovakia  (5  percent),  (Rutkowski,
2002, World Bank 2001a and 2001b).
The  large  scale  withdrawal  from  the  labor  force  is  a  worrisome  phenomenon.
Contrary  to  common  opinion,  it  does  not  ease  labor  market  pressure.  It  does  imply,
however,  that there  is a large  unutilized  human capacity in Bulgaria.  The magnitude of
the  problem  is  in  Bulgaria  larger  than  elsewhere.  The  labor  force  participation  rate  is
lower  in Bulgaria than  in other high unemployment  transition  economies,  with  negative
consequences  for the  output  level and poverty.  The  exact reasons behind the low  labor
force  parficipation  rate  in  Bulgaria  need  to  be  further  investigated.  One  possible
explanation  is  relative  generosity  and  accessibility  of non-employment  benefits  (e.g.
disability pensions).
3  The mnagnitude  of transitions from unemployment to inactivity may be overestimated,  however, as
the previous labor force status was determined based on respondents self-assessment.  Some respondents
who categorized themselves as unemployed one year earlier might in fact had been out of the labor force  (if
they were not actively looking for or not available  for a job.
- 7 -Less educated  blue collar workers are most hit  by unemployment
Some  categories  of workers  are  more  affected  by  the  labor market  slack  than
others.  The  risk  of losing  a job  and  becoming  unemployed  is  the  highest  for  less
educated men, especially with vocational or technical education.  This risk does not seem
to be significantly affected by urban/rural  residence,  nor by age (Table 4a).  Specifically,
men face  an  11  percent probability of losing a job, compared with  8 percent  for women.
Workers with secondary or lower education  are about two times as likely to lose a job as
workers  with  tertiary  education.  Lower  job  stability  among  workers  with  lower
educational  attainment  and  with  blue-collar  occupations  is  a  typical  pattern  among
industrialized countries,  and Bulgaria is no exception in this respect.
The best  chances  to  escape  unemployment  and  find  a job have  prime-age  men
with  secondary  or  higher  education,  and  those  living  in  rural  areas  (Table  4b).  For
example,  one in four workers  aged 30-45  finds  a new job within a year,  compared with
less than one in five workers less than  30 years of age.  Workers  with primary education
find  it particularly difficult to find a new job;  their exit  rate from unemployment  is only
17  percent,  compared  with that of 26-28  percent  for workers  with  secondary education.
This  is  yet  another  indication  that  the  Bulgarian  labor  market,  like  those  in  all
industrialized countries, offers a premium for higher skills.  Workers living in rural areas
have  somewhat  higher  chances  to  find  employment  than  their  urban  counterparts:  24
against  21  percent.  This  difference  is  much  more  pronounced  when  one  looks  at
quarterly  transition  rates,  which  indicates  that  rural jobs  are  frequently  of temporary
nature.  Still, the rural  labor market in Bulgaria seems to be more dynamic,  characterized
4 by higher labor turnover,  than urban the one.
4  Labor market dynamism,  as measured by worker flows,  does not necessarily translate  into higher
mcomes.  Despite  the fact that the rural labor market  is somewhat more dynamic than the urban one in
Bulgaria, the poverty rate is much higher in rural areas than in rural areas (World Bank 2002b).  This can
be explained by the nature of rural jobs, which are often seasonal, temporary,  low-skilled and thereby low-
paid.  These kind ofjobs do not lift families out of poverty and account for the phenomenon  of "working
poor".
-8  -Table  4a  Yearly  transition probabilities  from employment  by socio-demographic
groups, March 2000 - March 2001.
(percentage of employment, beginning of period)
Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
Total  83.4  9.3  7.3
Sex
male  83.3  10.6  6.1
female  84.1  7.9  7.9
Residence
urban  84.0  9.2  6.8
rural  81.4  9.5  9.0
Education  113.0  14.0  15.0
primary  79.6  9.9  10.6
secondary  80.5  10.2  9.4
secondary vocational  80.8  11.6  7.6
higher  92.3  5.3  2.4
Age
under 30  78.1  9.4  12.5
30 - 45  85.0  10.1  4.9
46+  84.2  8.3  7.5
Source: Kotzeva  (2002)
Table 4b  Yearly  transition probabilities from unemployment  by socio-demographic
groups, March 2000 - March 2001.
(percentage of employment, beginning of period)
Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
Total  22.1  37.4  40.5
Sex
male  22.5  39.2  38.3
female  21.8  35.2  43.0
Residencd
urban  21.1  40.6  38.3
rural  23.9  32.1  44.0
Education
primary  16.6  31.1  52.3
secondary  26.3  40.4  33.3
Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
secondary vocational  27.6  40.7  31.7
higher  25.0  62.5  12.5
Age
under 30  19.0  35.4  45.6
30- 45  25.3  42.4  32.3
46+  22.1  32.7  45.2
Source: Kotzeva  (2002)
9-The  most  likely  to  withdraw  from  the  labor  force  after  experiencing
unemployment  are poorly  educated  women  living  in rural areas,  either young  or older.
Poor  educational  attainment  stands  out  as  most  closely  associated  with  labor  force
withdrawal.  For  example,  over  one-half  of the  unemployed  with  primary  education
become  economically  inactive  within  one year,  compared  with  about  one-third  of the
unemployed  with  secondary  education  and  less  than  one-tenth  of those  with  tertiary
education.  Not surprisingly,  prime  age  workers are significantly  less likely to withdraw
from  the  labor  force  than  either  younger  or  older  workers.  Still,  the  labor  force
withdrawal  rate is very high in Bulgaria even among prime age workers.
Low job security with limited  job opportunities
It  is  usually  assumed  that  there  is  a  trade-off  between  job  security  and  the
availability of job opportunities.  High job stability and limited firing tend to go hand in
hand with  limited hiring and low chances  to  find a new job.  Conversely,  intense hiring
and high chances  to find a new job require  high labor turnover,  which comes  at the cost
of lower job  security.  Earlier  analysis  suggests  that  the  risk  of job  loss  has  become
relatively high in Bulgaria in recent years,  while the chances  to find a new job have been
and  still are limited.  It seems  that  Bulgaria has not yet reaped the benefits  of a  flexible
labor market.
To  examine  the  issue  of job  security  and job  opportunities  in  more  detail  we
looked  at  the  distribution  of job  tenure.  Short  average  job  tenure  indicates  frequent
changes of jobs, and thus is associated  with less job security.  At the same time,  a large
share of employees with  short tenure points to  intense hiring,  and thus better chances  to
find  a job.  In  contrast,  long  average job  tenure  implies job  stability,  but  also  implies
worse job opportunities  as the share of employees with short job tenure  is low, implying
limited hiring by employers.
The  average  duration  of job  tenure  is  relatively  short  in  Bulgaria,  which  is  a
characteristic  feature  of  virtually  all  transition  economies  (Table  6).  It  reflects  the
development  of the  new sector of the economy,  which consists of private, usually small,
- 10 -firms.  At the  same time,  however,  short job tenure  points  to  frequent job  changes and
thus  less job stability.  These job  changes are often involuntary,  caused by lay-offs,  and
thus the shortening of the average job tenure is indicative of the diminished  sense of job
security.
Expectedly,  private  sector jobs  are  less  secure  than  public  sector jobs.  In  the
private  sector  an  average  (median)  worker  has  been with  his current  employer  for less
than four years, while in the public sector the median tenure is considerably  longer (close
to nine years).  Still, despite the emergence  of the new private  sector, the average  tenure
is longer in Bulgaria than in countries with most flexible labor markets,  such as the U.S.
or the U.K.  The still sizable public sector in Bulgaria limits labor market dynamics.
While  the relative  size of the "new  sector" - consisting of employees  with short
job tenure - is  large  in Bulgaria compared  with European  countries with stagnant  labor
markets,  it is less impressive when compared with countries with dynamic labor markets.
Workers whose job tenure  is less than five years account  for 49 percent of all workers in
Bulgaria, more than France (41  percent) but less than in the Czech Republic, or Denmark
and  the  U.S  (around  55  percent).  Thus  the  dynamic  segment  of the  labor  market  is
relatively large in Bulgaria, but it is still less than one-half of the labor market at large.
- 11 -Table  §  lDistribution  of employment  a)  by job  tenure:  Bulgaria  agaimst  selected
countries (percetags)
I and  2 and  5  and  10 and  Average  Median
Under 1  under 2  under 5  under  10  under 20  20 years  tenure  tenure
years  years  years  years  (years)  (years)
Bulgaria (2001)  14.0  9.5  25.2  20.8  19.8  10.8  8.1  5.5
Private sector  20.6  13.0  32.0  18.5  10.6  5.9  5.6  3.5
Public sector  7.3  5.7  17.6  23.2  30.0  16.2  10.8  8.5
Czech R.  19.2  36.6  12.0  14.8  17.4  9.0  2.0
Denmark  25.1  11.4  16.2  18.2  17.7  11.4  7.9  4.4
France  15.0  8.0  17.7  17.4  23.3  18.7  10.7  7.7
Germany  16.1  9.4  22.0  17.2  18.4  17.0  9.7  10.7
Lithuania (2001)  15.4  8.9  21.6  25.4  16.8  11.9  8.3  5.0
Poland (1999)  14.5  11.7  19.0  17.7  20.3  16.7  9.6  6.2
Spain  35.5  4.9  11.1  14.4  17.7  16.5  8.9  4.6
United Kingdom  19.6  10.7  19.5  23.5  17.3  9.4  7.8  5.0
United States  26.0  8.5  20.0  19.8  16.8  9.0  7.4  4.2
a)  Wage and salary workers
Note: data for the OECD  countries refer to 1995.
Source:
Bulgaria:  LFS June 2001, Bank staff calculations.
Lithuania and Poland: Rutkowski (2002)
OECD  countries - OECD  Employment  Outlook 1997
The  most  indicative  of labor  market  dynamics,  and  specifically  of the  hiring
dynamics, is the share of workers with tenure shorter than one year.  These are new hires,
and the  more  dynamic  is the labor  market, the higher  is their proportion.  This share  is
low  in  Bulgaria  compared  with  countries  with  flexible  labor  markets  (Denmark,  the
U.S.),  and even  somewhat lower than in other high unemployment  transition  economies
(Lithuania and Poland).  To illustrate,  new hires  account for  14 percent of all workers  in
Bulgaria.  In  the  Czech  Republic  their  share  is  five  percentage  points  higher,  and  in
Lithuania  is one percentage point higher.  Yet, new hires account for more than one-third
of all workers in Spain and one-fourth of workers in Denmark and the U.S.
Expectedly,  the  share  of short-tenured  workers  is  much  higher  in the  private
sector (21  percent) than  in the public sector (7 percent), providing  yet  another indication
that the former is much more dynamic  and hires relatively  more workers,  than the  latter.
-12-Still  even  in  the  private  sector  the  share  of new  hires  is  less  than  in  countries  with
dynamic labor markets.
The  comparison with  Spain  is particularly  instructive.  Why is the share of new
hires  so high in Spain? Unemployment  has been traditionally high in Spain, in large part
due to substantial  dismissal costs, which have  discouraged  employers from hiring.  Thus,
in  order  to  foster  hiring  the  Spanish  government  relaxed  restrictions  on  fixed-term
contracts,  which  rendered  them  very  popular  among  employers  and  led  to  sharply
increased hiring and employment growth.  Although fixed-term contracts are not the first-
best solution and create problems of their own, they can provide a strong initial stimulus
for job creation.  The use of fixed-term  contracts is restricted  in Bulgaria  and combined
with relatively high procedural costs of dismissals  this contributes to limited hiring (these
issues will be discussed in more detail later in this paper).
To conclude, jobs in Bulgaria have become  less stable.  Much fewer workers  than before
hold their current job  for a prolonged  period of time.  This  indicates more  labor market
dynamics  but also  less job  security.  The  increased  risk of job loss  has  so  far not been
coupled with the improved  chances of finding a new job.  Job security has been lost, but
new employment opportunities  are still limited.  Hiring conditions have been and still are
relatively weak, insufficient to absorb substantial  firing.  The next section tries to answer
why this is the case.
II.  SOURCES OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT
The previous  section documented  weak labor market outcomes  in Bulgaria.  This
section  will  try to  identify  the sources  of these  weak  outcomes.  First,  it looks  at key
macroeconomic  developments  and  changes  in  the  investment  climate  that  might  have
impacted  labor market performance.  Second,  it analyzes job creation and job destruction
associated with enterprise restructuring.  Third, the section examines  the extent of the skill
mismatch  and  its  contribution  to  unemployment.  Finally,  it  discusses  the  role  of labor
market regulations  as a possible source of rigidities and distortions.
It  was  found  that  in  general  the  macroeconomic  conditions  and  the  investment
climate  have  improved  substantially  in Bulgaria  since  1997,  and thus if anything  have
- 13 -facilitated  job  creation  rather  than  contributed  to  unemployment.  Despite  this  overall
positive  trend,  the  business  environment  is  still moderately  friendly  and  there  is  much
scope for improvement.  However,  stable  macroeconomic  conditions and the  associated
improvement  in the  investment  climate,  as well  as  accelerated  privatization  have  given
rise  to  far-reaching  structural  changes  which  have  resulted  in  larger  flows  into
unemployment.  The  fall  in  employment  has  largely  reflected  substantial  productivity
gains achieved through large scale shifts away from old less productive industries toward
new more productive jobs.  At the same  time,  it will be later documented  that  outflows
from unemployment have been limited, owing to skill and spatial mismatches,  as well as
some  labor  market  rigidities  stemming  from  the  employment  protection  legislation.
These factors  combined  - restructuring  and productivity  improvements  along with labor
market mismatches  and rigidities - have caused the recently observed  marked increase in
unemployment.  Accordingly,  unemployment  in Bulgaria seems mainly structural,  and to
a lesser extent demand deficient.
2.1  Macroeconomic  Developments  and Investment Climate
This  sub-section  examines  macroeconomic  developments  since  the  1996-1997
macroeconomic  crisis with a view of determining  their impact on job creation.  The key
developments can be summarized as follows.5
Macroeconomic  developments have been conducive to job creation
After a deep  financial crisis combined with a hyperinflation  shock in 1996 - 1997,
the  Bulgarian  economy  has  gone  through  significant  market-oriented  structural  and
institutional reforms.  Since  1997, the economy has been characterized by positive growth
of  output  combined  with  price  and  exchange-rate  stability.  The  currency  board
arrangement  (CBA)  of 1997  restricted  the  governmental  discretion  in monetary  policy
and eventually brought financial stability and fiscal prudence.
During  the  1996-1997  crisis  output  contracted  by  more than  16  percent  in real
terms.  As the level of employment remained almost unchanged, the decline in output was
5  Analysis in this and the following sub-section draws on Stoev (2002).
- 14 -reflected  in  the productivity  dynamics,  dropped by some  15  percent.  Real  wages  were
even more  sensitive to the crisis  as they  lost about  1/3  of their value.  Accordingly,  the
brunt of adjustment  to  the  fall  in  output  was  borne by wages  rather than  employrnent
(Table  6).
Table 6  Dynamics  of basic macroeconomic  indicators
1995=100
Average
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001a)  annual rate of
growth,  %
GDP  89.9  83.5  86.5  88.5  93.7  97.9  -0.4
Employment  100.1  96.2  96.1  94.1  89.7  95.1  -0.8
Productivity  89.8  86.8  90.0  94.1  104.5  102.9  0.5
Wages  81  2  67.7  81.7  87.3  88.3  90.9  -1.6
a) Tentative  estimate.
Source:  National  Statistical  Institute and the World  Bank  (GDP data).
The  average  productivity  recovered  its pre-crisis  levels  in  2001.  Productivity
grew by almost  19 percent between  1998  and  2000,  although recently  it  seems that the
pace  of growth  has  decreased.  Meanwhile,  the ratio of productivity  in private sector to
productivity  in public sector narrowed  from  1.5  in  1995  to  1.0 in 2000.  This narrowing
of inter-sectoral  differences  in  productivity  is  a  positive  phenomenon,  as  it  indicates
successful  restructuring  of the  public  firms,  and  thereby  the  progress  of the  transition
(World Bank 2002).  Real wages followed the rising productivity  and their recovery has
proceeded  at a similarly high pace,  although their level  in 2001  was still some  10 percent
below their pre-crisis level.
The CBA of 1997  substituted a system of strict rules for monetary policy conduct
for an entirely discretionary central banking.  The immediate  impacts of the new monetary
system  were  the  price  and  exchange  rate  stabilization  and restored  confidence  in  the
commercial  banks. The  CBA eventually brought  a more  stable  and predictable  business
environment  that  was  conductive  for  the  entry  of new  and  the  expansion  of existing
firms.
- 15-The fiscal prudence after 1997 has also been beneficial for businesses as it made it
possible to  lower interest rates.  The high budget  deficit prevailing  in Bulgaria until the
crisis  period  went  hand  in  hand  with  high  levels  of nominal  interest  rates  which
discouraged  economic  activity.  The budget  deficit  has been  kept  close to  zero  for the
past 4  years  (i.e.  since  1997),  permitting  the  lowering  of interest  rates  and thus,  along
with relatively low inflation, crating incentives for private investment.
Since the financial  stabilization of 1997, both the volume of investments and their
share  in GDP have been increasing.  In addition,  a marked  acceleration of the inflow of
FDI  has  occurred  following  the  stabilization  policies.  For  example,  green-field
investments  more  than  doubled  in  1998  compared  with  the  previous  year.  This
substantial  increase  in investments,  including  FDI  inflows,  is  indicative  of an  overall
significant  improvement in investment climate  in the aftermath of the implementation of
the macroeconomic  stabilization program.
In contrast  to the  crisis period,  it  was employment  which  has  taken the  brunt of
adjustment  during  the  course of economic  recovery,  while wages  have been  recovering
from the earlier sharp decline.  Since 1997 aggregate  employment  fell by about 7 percent,
largely  because  job  destruction  in  the  ex-state-owned  companies  was  faster  than  job
creation in business starts-up and existing de novo private companies.
At  the  same  time,  the  government  has  maintained  some  level  of protection  of
large public enterprises through direct and indirect subsidies, without imposing necessary
discipline  (i.e.  a hard budget constraint)  thus  preventing the  exit of inefficient  firms and
hindering the  release  of assets  and labor  to become  available  for  more efficient use by
restructured and new enterprises.
Why has employment declined  in Bulgaria?  One way to answer this  question  is
to look at  the dynamics of productivity as well as aggregate  demand and its components:
domestic  consumption,  exports,  and  imports.  Given  the  rate  of growth  of output,  the
faster  the  growth  of productivity,  the  slower  the  growth  of employment.  Growth  of
domestic consumption  and exports  is conducive  to employment growth, while the growth
of imports  means  that  foreign  labor  is  substituted for domestic  labor.  Thus,  given  the
- 16-output  level,  growth  of  imports  leads  to  the  fall  in  domestic  employment.  These
relationships  are  captured  by  the  following  decomposition  of the  rate  of employment
growth:
rE =r(  J-+r  (Jr(  J  - r
where r denotes the growth  rate of employment (E),  domestic demand  (D),  exports  (A), imports
(Ad),  and labor productivity (P), while Q represents total output.
Applying the above  formula to the  1997-2000  data we  see  a strong job-creating
effect of the  growth in domestic  demand,  and to  a much  lesser extent, of the growth  of
exports.  However,  the job-creating  impact of exports  is markedly smaller than the job-
displacing  impact of imports.  But the  strongest negative  effect  on employment has  had
the  substantial  growth  in  labor productivity,  which  has  offset  the  growth  of aggregate
demand  (Table  7).  The  results  of the  decomposition  provide  further  support  to  the
argument  that  an  important  cause  of  growing  unemployment  has  been  intensive
enterprise restructuring  associated with the shedding of redundant labor, which has led to
strong gains in labor productivity.
Table  7 Decomposition  of employment  change
(% changes)
1997/98  1998/99  1999/2000  Average  Total
1997/2000  1997/2000
Employment  -015  -2.10  -4.91  -2.39  -6.8
Aggregate demand  3.38  2.34  5.48  3 73  12.1
Domestic demand  11.69  7.31  3.71  7.57  24.0
Exports  - 11.23  - 2.77  16.82  0.94  4.3
Imports (-)  - 2 92  2.19  15.05  4.77  16.2
Productivity  (-)  3.53  4.35  9.90  5.93  20.3
Total contribution  - 0.15  - 2.00  - 4.42  -2.19  -8.2
Source:  Stoev (2002)  and author's calculations.
Since  1997  privatization  has  gained  momentum  and  three-fourths  of  the
privatizable  assets  have  been  transferred  from  the public  to  the  private  sector  over the
past 5 years.  Consequently,  private sector  employment has increased  dramatically  from
42 percent in 1996 to 71 percent in 2001.
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productivity  improvements  in privatized  enterprises  since  1997  have outpaced  those  in
new private  enterprises.  This  is  associated  with  the  fact  that  productivity  growth  has
been  faster  in  the  large  companies  than  in  SMEs.  However,  restructuring  and  fast
productivity growth have  led to downsizing  and  employment  loses concentrated  in large
privatized  firms.  These have been only partially offset by the employment  opportunities
created by private SMEs.
As in other transition countries,  privatization contracts in Bulgaria as  a rule have
included  a commitment  of the new  owner to  maintain employment  levels  for  a certain
agreed period  (usually  a  few  years).  Given  that  the privatization  process  was  heavily
concentrated  in  1997,  some  portion  of  the  substantial  decline  in  employment  that
occurred  in 2000  can be  attributed  to  the expiration of the  labor preservation  clauses  in
the privatization  contracts.
Although  the investment climate has improved significantly since the  1997  crisis,
the business  environment remains  relatively  underdeveloped.  This includes  inconsistent
law  implementation,  frequent  legal  changes,  considerable  discretionary  powers of local
authorities  and  bureaucratic  harassment  (e.g.  frequent  inspections  and  audits),
complicated  and  lengthy  firm  registration  procedures,  a  stringent  licensing  and permit
regime,  high  taxation,  including  high  payroll  taxes.  A  survey by FIAS  (2000)  on the
administrative  barriers  to  business  in  Bulgaria  found  that  two  major  reasons  for  the
generally  'unfriendly  business  environment  are  the  lack  of institutional  capacity,  and
suspicious  attitude,  especially  of  municipal  authorities,  towards  the  private  sector.
Corruption  is  also  a problem,  causing  distortions  and imposing  an additional  burden on
firms.6 Unfriendly  business  environment  inhibits job  creation  and  thus  developing  an
enabling business environment should become  a focal point of the government's  strategy
to foster job creation and reduce unemployment.
6  The level of administrative  corruption (measured as the  share of finn revenue paid m unofficial
payments  to public officials  in order to "get thmgs done")  is higher in Bulgaria than m leadmg reformers
such as Estonia,  Hungary or Poland.  It is estimated that in Bulgaria bribes on average account  for over 2
percent of firms annual revenues (World Bank 2000)).
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the  infonnal  economy  accounts  for  about  one  fourth  of GDP  (Nenovsky  and Hristov,
2000).  The  reasons  behind  the  large  informal  sector  include  high  taxation,  over-
regulation  and bureaucratic  harassment in the formal sector.  For many informal  firms the
potential benefits  of formalization  (such as access to credit, social  insurance)  exceed the
costs.  Although  the  informal  sector  provides  employment  opportunities  for  a  non-
negligible  fraction  of the  workforce,  these  are usually low productivity,  precarious jobs
with no employment protection.
In summary,  macroeconomic  conditions  and  investment  climate  have  improved
significantly in Bulgaria following the  1996-1997 macroeconomic  crisis,  and the country
has undergone  far-reaching  industrial  restructuring which has led to  a better allocation  of
resources,  including labor.  This has created preconditions  for economic and employment
growth.  However,  the  business  environment  remains  unsatisfactory,  with  a  negative
effect on job creation.
Key  macroeconomic  developments  and  their  impact  on  job  creation  are
summarized in Table 8.
Table 8  Key developments  and their impact on job creation (1997 - 2001)
Impact on job creation Policy area  Change  aduepomn
and unemployment
Monetary policy (Currency board arrangement)  Improvement  Positive
Fiscal policy  Improvement  Overall:  Positive
Reduction of subsidies and  the imposition of hard  Improvement  Short term: negative
budget constraint on public firms  Long term: positive
Budget deficit within 2% of CDP  Improvement  Positive in the long term
Financial Intermediation  Improvement  Positive
Privatization of state-owned banks  Improvement  Positive
Increased supply of bank credits  Improvement  Positive
Privatization and enterprise restructuring  Acceleration  Overall:  Positive
Reallocation of labor  Acceleration  Short term: negative
Long term: positive
Productivity  Improvement  Short term:  negative
Long term: positive
Business  Environment  Stable  Overall:  Mixed
Scope  of arbitrary  decision  making  and  attitude  Stable  Negative
towards private businesses
Entry and licensing procedures  Stable/Deterioration  Negative
Business regulation,  including labor  Modest improvement  Positive
Taxation  Stable  Negative
Reduction of price controls  Improvement  Positive
Source:  based on Stoev (2002)
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After this broad-brush sketch of key macroeconomic developments  let us focus on
the issue of industrial restructuring  which is central to the dynamics of employment  and
unemployment.
Restructuring  in Bulgaria has  had  many  facets:  the changing  industrial  structure
of output  and  employment,  changes  in  the  ownership  structure,  the  growing  share  of
foreign  capital,  and  the  development  of the  SME  sector.  All  these  changes  entail
profound job  and  labor  flows.  They have  created opportunities  for some  categories  of
workers,  mainly the younger  and better skilled and, worsened the employment  prospects
of other categories,  mainly the older and less skilled.  Restructuring  has created winners
and losers,  and as such has had an impact on the level and composition of poverty.
The  most  visible  manifestation  of the  economic  transition  that  is  underway  in
Bulgaria  has  been  the  change  in  the  structure  of output,  namely  a  shift  away  from
manufacturing,  that was overdeveloped  during the communist period, towards previously
underdeveloped  services  (Table  9).  Thus,  as  in  other  transition  economies,  job
opportunities  in Bulgaria  emerge mainly  in the services  sector,  while many jobs in  the
manufacturing  sector are at risk.  This change  in the structure of output entails  a change
in the structure of labor demand:  the fall in demand for blue collar workers  and physical
labor and the rise in demand  for white collar workers  with skills  required  in the service
sector.  The transition  from manufacturing  to services  is not  an easy one,  as the newly
created  jobs differ  substantially  from the  old ones  in terms  of skills  content.  Thus,  for
many workers  who  lost their jobs in the old  sector finding  work  in the new  sector  is  a
difficult  process, often leading  to unemployment  or withdrawal  from the labor force  (as
documented in the previous section).
- 20 -Table 9  Structure of Gross Value Added
(percentage  shares)
1995  1998  2001*
Services  53.9  50.2  56.7
Industry  32.7  28.7  28.3
Agriculture  13.4  21.1  15.0
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Note:  Gross  Value  Added  represents  GDP  minus  adjustments,  which  are  the  financial  intermediation
services indirectly measured, non-deductible value-added  tax, excises and import duties;
* First 9 months.
Source: National Statistical Institute; reported  in Stoev (2002)
The change in the structure of output is linked to privatization  and even more so
to  the  development  of the  new  private  sector.  Table  10  shows  that  the  privatization
process started late in Bulgaria, only in 1997,  but since then has proceeded  at a relatively
high pace,  so that  currently most assets are privately owned.  As a result of accelerated
privatization  as  well  as  the development  of the  new private  sector,  the  private  sector's
share in total employment  is currently over 70 percent, up from about 40 percent in  1996.
Table 10  Development  of the private sector,  1995-2001
(percentages)
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Total
Private  sector's  share  in  41  42  55  61  65  70  71  na
employment
Share  of  state  assets  1.1  4.1  18.4  4.5  17.0  4.4  1.1  52.5
privatized
na = not applicable.
Note: The methodology  employed by the Privatization Agency in reporting an asset pnvatized requires that
either  the  asset  is directly  sold  or  the  company  that  owns  it is fully  privatized  (more  than  2/3  of the
company's shares are private)
Source:  National  Statistical  Institute, Privatization Agency; reported in  Stoev (2002).
Another aspect of privatization  has been the inflow of foreign investment,  which
sharply  accelerated  in  1997,  when  the  stabilization  package  was  put  in  place.  The
dynamics  of FDI flows is shown in Table  12.  The impact of FDI on the economy may be
profound  as  it  brings  with  itself new  technologies,  management  practices,  etc.  FDI
creates  new jobs,  but  again,  these jobs  are  different  from  those  lost in  the  old  sector:
require new and usually higher skills.
- 21 -Table 11  IFIDII  Fllows in Bulgaria
(USD million)
Year  Volume
Privatization  Capital  Market  Green-field  Total
1995  26  137  163
1996  76  - 180  256
1997  421  30  185  636
1998  156  64  400  620
1999  306  53  447  806
2000  480  20  500  1  000
2001*  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  522
Total  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  523
Note: * Includes the period January - October 2001
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investmnent  Agency and Bulgarian National Bank; reported m Stoev (2002).
Business environment should be improved
The  development  of  a  market  economy  in  Bulgaria,  as  in  other  transition
countries,  is associated with the creation of new, usually small,  firms and the growth of
the  SME  sector.7 These  new  firms  drive  the  transition  and  provide  foundation  for
sustainable economic  growth.  At the same time, the large  firmn sector - overblown under
central  planning  - has been  gradually  declining.  Table  12  illustrates  this process.  The
number of enterprises has grown visibly in Bulgaria since mid 1990s,  which is a positive
sign indicating an improvement in investment climate.
However,  new  firms  (proxied  by small  finns)  still  account  for  a  relatively  low
share of total  employment and value added  (Table  13).  The share of small enterprises  in
employment was  38 percent  and in value added 24 percent  in  1999, which is much less
than in leading  reformers, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary in Poland (well over 50
percent).8 After all,  the share  of small  firms  in  employment  in  Bulgaria  is below  the
threshold of 40 percent,  which is considered  a prerequisite  for sustainable  economic  and
7  Firms are categorized  as small if they employ up to 50 employees,  and as medium if they employ
51-100 employees.
8  Most recent (2000) NSI data show that the share of small firms in employment is 41  percent,
which is still low.
- 22 -employment  growth (World Bank,  2002).
The  low  share  of employment  in  small  enterprises  in  Bulgaria  should  be  of
concern.  One of key findings of World Bank (2002a) report on transition is that "Simply
having a small number of highly productive small  enterprises is not enough.  Unless  it is
combined  with  rapid  growth  in  the  share  of  employment,  the  small  sector  will  not
develop the critical mass to lead to aggregate economic growth."
The  insufficient rate of new enterprise  growth  and the resulting  low share of the
new  sector  in  employment  point  to  barriers  to  entry  and  unfavorable  business
environment  in Bulgaria.  This  may turn  to be a critical  constraint  for job  creation and
employment  growth.  Relatively  slow growth of new enterprises  is  a likely factor behind
high  unemployment  in  Bulgaria,  as  the  number  of jobs  created  in  the  new,  small
enterprise,  sector  falls short of the number of jobs eliminated  in the old,  large enterprise,
sector.
Table 12 Number of Enterprises by Size,  1996-2000
(in thousands)
Enterprise  size  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Micro-enterprises  164.1  175.  1  190.0  195. 3  205.9
Small enterprises  9.1  9.8  11.1  11.8  12.8
Medium enterprises  2. 1  2.0  2.2  2.1  2.1
Enterprises  employing  2.7  2.4  2.4  2.2  2.2
over 100 people
Total  178.0  189.4  205.6  211.3  223.1
Note  Micro-enterpnses  have  up  to  9  employees,  Small  enterprises  - between  10  and  50;  Medium  enterprises  -
between  51  and  100.
Source  Agency for  Small  and Medium-sized  Enterprises  (ASME)  and National  Statistical  fnstitute,  reported  in Stoev
(2002)
- 23 -Table 13 Employment and Value Added by Enterprise Size
(percentage shares)
Enterprise size  Employment  Gross Value Added
1996  1999  1996  1999
Micro  16  22  10  13
Small  12  16  11  11
Medium  8  9  6  7
Large  64  53  73  69
Micro  up to 9 employees, Small  10-50 employees,  Medium 51-100 employees,  Large  over  100 employees
Only employees  employed on the basis of labor contract.
Value Added is  the difference between output and  intermediate consumption.  That is  the difference between  the value
of  goods and services produced and the cost of  raw  materials and other inputs which are used up in  production.
Source:  Agency for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises; reported in Stoev (2002).
Entry of new  private  firms  is critical  for restructuring,  productivity  growth and
job  creation.  However,  births of new  firms  are associated  with simultaneous  deaths of
old, inefficient  firms, which is a normal and healthy process  of "creative destruction"  or
market  selection,  whereby  it  is  the  fittest  firms  that  survive  the  test  of  market
competition.  Table  14 documents  that  firm  turnover has been relatively  high in recent
years,  providing  yet another evidence  for the  profound  structural change taking place in
Bulgaria.  Both the births and death of firms have been on a rising trend since 1997.  For
example,  83  thousand  new firms entered the  market in 2000, i.e. twenty thousands  more
than  in  1997.  This  steady  increase  in  the  number  of business  start-ups  points  to
improvements in investment climate.  Concomitantly,  the increase in the number of firm
deaths  indicate that exit of firms - necessary for the efficient functioning of the economy
- has become  more  prevalent.  However,  high  firm  turnover places a heavy burden  on
labor.  Workers  displaced  from  firms  that  close  often  find  it  difficult  to  make  the
transition  to  new  firms,  as  they  are  located  in  different  place,  industry  and  require
different skills.
- 24 -Table 14 Births and Deaths of Firms
1997  1998  1999  2000
Births ('000)  63.7  70.6  72.0  83.1
Deaths ('000)  52.3  54.3  66.4  71.4
Firm turnover (%)  21.8  21.1  21.0  21.2
Firm turnover = births and deaths  as a percentage  of all active firms.
Source:  Stoev (2002).
Despite  the marked  increase  in the  number of businesses  in Bulgaria,  there  still
are  considerable  obstacles  to new  entry  and business  growth.  The  legal  framework  is
inconsistent,  which  creates  scope  for  arbitrary  decisions  making  and  abuse  of power.
Registration  and  licensing  procedures  are  more  difficult  and  lengthy  than  in  other
countries.  For example,  as many as seven different permits are needed to start a new firm
in Bulgaria,  compared with two in the U.K.,  or three in Estonia and Poland.  In addition,
the number of business  activities that require  a permit  increased  from 42  in  1995  to  100
in  2000  (Stoev,  2002).  Business  activity  is  over-regulated  which  creates  scope  for
bureaucratic  harassment  and  corruption.  Box  1 illustrates  problems  faced  by  small
entrepreneurs  based on an opinion survey.
Box  1 Small entrepreneurs complain about business  environment
A few quotes from the survey of small entrepreneurs  illustrate the problems they face in
opening and running a business:
"If I had to start again,  I would not even think of opening a business."
"I can not even remember how many times I went for each permit. It is just insanely
long".
"During the inspections  they pick on every single thing.  When they decide to pick up
your money, there is no way out.  They always find something to pick on."
"You must hold a law degree to be able to open a cafeteria."
"Instead of thinking how to be more efficient we spend 60 percent of our time thinking
how to cope with tax authorities  and inspectors."
"There should be rules of the game, but clear ones and equally applicable to all".
Source:  Gancheva  et al. (2000).
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In  addition,  the level  of business  taxation  is high.  High  labor  taxes  (PIT  and
payroll  taxes)  are  of particular  concern  as they negatively  affect  labor demand  and job
creation.  The tax wedge between labor costs to employer  and take home pay amounts to
41  percent  in Bulgaria, which is high (Figure  1).  It means  that out of 100 Leva paid by
employer as labor compensation,  employees receive only 59  Leva, while the rest is taken
in the  form of taxes  and  contributions.  Table  15  shows  the  structure  of payroll  taxes.
Obviously,  these taxes and contributions  in most part are used to finance the provision of
important  public  and  social  goods,  such  as  education,  health  care,  social  security,  etc.
Nonetheless,  the  effect  of  a  large  tax  wedge  is  lower  wages  and  lower  employment,
which  represent  a  so  called  "deadweight  loss"  of taxation.  Thus,  a  reform  of public
expenditures  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  system,  is  an  important  but  often
overlooked component of a strategy to foster job creation.
Table 15  Payroll Taxes
,(Percent of gross wage)
2001
Total payroll tax rate  42.7
Social Secunty  32.7
Health  6.0
Unemployment Fund  4.0
Paid by employer  34.2
Social Secunty  26.2
Health  4.8
Unemployment Fund  3.2
Paid by employee  8.5
Social Security  6.5
Health  1.2
Unemployment Fund  0.8
Notes:  Social  Security  comprises  the  pay-roll  tax  for  the  public  pay-as-you-go  pension  fund  and  the
mandatory contributions to private pension funds
The contributions are split between employer and employee  according to the following gradually changing
scheme: 2001 - 80:20, 2002 - 75:25, 2003 - 70:30, 2004 - 65:35, 2005 - 60:40, 2006 - 55:45, and 2007 -
50:50.
Source: Stoev (2002).
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Figure 1  Tax wedge
Policy  implications
Two  broad  policy  recommendations  flow  from  the  above  analysis.  First,  that  the
government  should focus  on removing existing barriers  to entry and improving business
environment.  Business regulations need  to be streamlined,  and transparent  rules need to
be substituted  for bureaucratic  discretion.  Importantly,  attitude towards private  business
should change in a positive direction.  Business entry should become easier and licensing
and  permit procedures  should be reduced  to  a minimum.  Second,  the  burden of taxes,
including  labor taxes,  should be  reduced to  foster  both labor  supply and  labor demand.
This  requires  a  substantial  improvement  in  the efficiency  of public  seivices  deliver  so
that a  socially  desired  amount  of services  can  be  delivered  at lower  cost.  These  two
groups  of measures  can help to achieve  a third  important objective,  that is the reduction
in  the  scope  of the  informal  sector,  as  they  will  lower  the  cost  of moving  from  the
informal  to  the  formal  sector.  This  in  turn  can  set  in  motion  a  virtuous  circle  of
- 27-broadening the tax base and thus increasing budget revenues which will make it possible
to further reduce tax rates.
2.2  Enterprise Restructuring:  Job Creation and Job Destruction
Persistent  unemployment  means  that job  creation  falls short  of job  destruction.
However,  there  is  also  a  less  direct  link  between  job  creation,  job  destruction  and
unemployment.  It is argued that high job tumover - which is the sum of  job creation and
job  destruction  - may  increase  overall  unemployment,  but at  the  same time  is likely to
lower the  average  duration of unemployment  (Garibaldi  et  al.,  1996).  This  is because
high job  turnover  implies  larger  inflows  into  unemployment,  but  simultaneously  also
larger outflows from unemployment  to jobs.  Conversely,  low job turnover is expected to
be  associated  with  longer  duration  of  unemployment  spells,  although  the  overall
unemployment  pool  may  be  smaller.  Job  tumover  (reallocation)  is  an  indicator  of
industrial restructuring, which entails shifts away from old, low productivity jobs towards
new,  presumably  higher  productivity  jobs.  It  is  also  an  indicator  of  labor  market
flexibility,  as  labor  market  rigidities  are  reflected  in  limited  firing  and  hiring,  while  a
flexible and dynamic  labor market is characterized  by intense job creation going hand in
hand with job destruction.
High  job turnover
Earlier research on job tumover in Bulgaria found that it was relatively low in the
mid  1990s;  indicating  limited  restructuring  and  the  existence  of labor market  rigidities
(Faggio  and Konings,  1999,  Garibaldi,  2001).9  In contrast,  the 2000 data show that job
reallocation  in  Bulgaria  is  quite  substantial.'0 Looking  at  the  so  called  excess  job
reallocation  rate, which  is the most adequate  measure of restructuring,  one can  see  that
9  The results presented by Faggio and Konings (1999) and cited in Garibaldi  (2001) understate  the
extent of job turnover in Bulgaria because  they were obtained using a sample consisting of only large
enterpnses.  As we will show later, job turnover is considerably higher in small firms than in large  firms
and thus the omission of small firms is bound to bias the results downwards.  Nonetheless,  the finding that
the pace of  job reallocation has increased in Bulgaria over recent years is robust to differences  in sample
charactenstics.  We calculated the rates of job creation and job destruction  for 2000 using a sub-sample
consisting of firms employing  more than 100 workers (which is comparable to that used by Faggio and
Konings)  and still obtained values  significantly higher than those for 1997 and earlier years.
- 28 -the  extent  of enterprise  restructuring  in Bulgaria  is similar  to  or higher than  in mature
market  economies  (including  the  dynamic  U.S.  market)  and  relatively  successful
transition  economies,  such as  Poland  (Table  16)."  It  is  much higher  than  in Slovakia,
where the labor market is rigid  and stagnant, although markedly lower than in Lithuania,
which  has  one  of the  most  dynamic  labor  markets  in  CEE.  Thus,  by  international
standards Bulgaria is undergoing far-reaching  industrial restructuring, which is associated
with intense job reallocation.
For  illustration,  in  2000  the  rate  of excess job  reallocation  was  21  percent  in
Bulgaria.  This means that  close  to  11  percent  (21/2) of all jobs were  reallocated  from
contracting  to  expanding  firms.  In  Lithuania  the rate  was 27 percent,  and  at  the other
extreme, in Slovakia,  it stood at only 4 percent.
to  Descnption of the data set used to calculate job turnover rates is  provided  in Annex  1.
11  One would have expected that the excess job reallocation rates will be higher in  transition
econonmes than in mature market economies,  as the former need to redress the inherited problem of
misallocation of resources.
- 29 -Table 16  Job creation and job destructAon:  Bulgaria against selected countries
(as percent of total  emp2loyment)
Transition economies  OECD  economies
United Bulgaria  Lithuania  Poland  Russia  Slovakia  France  Germany  States
2000  1998-99  1998-99  1998-99  1997-98  1984-91  1983-90  1984-91
Job creation rate  10 6  13.6  9.7  12.2  2.0  12.7  9.0  13.0
Openings  3.8  3.8  4.4  ..  ..  6.1  2.5  8.4
Expansions  6.8  9.7  5.3  ..  ..  6.6  6.5  4.6
Job  destruction
rate  14.1  17.7  11.5  13.8  6.9  11.8  7.5  10.4
Closures  3.3  7.0  1.4  ..  ..  5.5  1.9  7.3
Contractions  10.8  10.7  10.1  ..  ..  6.3  5.6  3.1
Employment
change  -3.5  -4.1  -1.8  -1.6  -4.9  0.9  1.5  2.6
Continuing
establishments only  -4.1  -0 9  -4.8  ..  ..  0.3  0.9  1.5
Job turnover rate  24.7  31.2  21.2  26.0  8.9  22.4  16.5  23.4
Continuing
establishments only  17.6  20.4  15.4  ..  12.9  12.1  7.7
Excess  job
reallocation rate  21.1  27.1  19.4  24.4  4.0  21.5  15.0  20.8
Continuing
establishments  only  13.5  19.4  10.5  ...  12.6  11.2  6.2
Note: data for OECD countries are yearly averages, data for transition economies refer only to
one year.
Sources:
Bulgaria: The Survey of Employment and Wages, 2000; Bank staff calculations (See  Annex 1  B  for the
description of the survey)
Lithuania:  Rutkowski (2002)
Poland: Rutkowski (2001)
Russia: Broadman  and Recanatini (2001)
Slovakia: World Bank (2001 c)
OECD  countries: OECD  (1996)
12  The primary  concepts  underlying  the  measurement  of labor  market  flexibility  are those  of job
creation  and  job  destruction,  while  other  measures  are  derived  from  them.  Specific  definitions  are  as
follows.  The gross  job creation rate is measured as the sum of all employment gains  in expanding  firms in
a given  year,  divided  by  total  employment  at  the  beginning  of the  year.  Gross job destruction rate  is
defined  as  the  sum  of  all  employment  losses  in  contracting  firms  in  a  given  year  divided  by  total
employment.  The  sum  of gross job  creation  and  gross job  destruction  gives  a  measure  of gross job
turnover (reallocation), and  the  difference  yields  the  rate  of  employment  growth.  The  excess job
reallocation  rate  is defined as the job reallocation rate minus the absolute value of net employment growth.
It is worth  noting,  that  the  excess  job reallocation  is  determined  by  the  lesser  of job creation  and job
destruction rates.
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of other  countries,  leads  to  a few  interesting  observations.  First, job  gains  in Bulgaria
have  been  achieved  mainly  through  employment  expansions  in  continuing  firms,  less
through  firm  entry  (business  start-ups).  Second,  job  losses  have  occurred  largely  in
contracting  firms, with  limited  impact of firm  exit  (closures).  These  two  findings  are
consistent  with and provide  further support  to  the earlier  observation  that there  are  still
undue  barriers  to entry and exit in Bulgaria.  Third,  the job  creation rate  is moderate  in
Bulgaria,  while  the job  destruction  rate  is high  by  international  standards.  Thus, job
destruction  exceeds job  creation,  implying  a reduction  in  the  total  number of jobs and
employment.  To illustrate,  Bulgarian  firms  created  close to  11  percent  of new jobs  in
2000,  of which  just  below  7  percent  in  continuing  firms.  At  the  same  time,  they
destroyed  14 percent of all jobs, of which nearly  11  percent in continuing enterprises.  As
a  result,  the  overall  number  of jobs  fell  by  over  3  percent.  Fourth,  the  high  job
destruction rate (especially in continuing  firms) indicates that dismissal costs are not high
to the degree  that would deter firing.  However,  they may be high enough  to  discourage
hiring.  Finally, the high job turnover  rate points to intense  restructuring  in Bulgaria  and
to high labor market  dynamic.  This  implies  that there  is  a  fair amount  of labor market
flexibility.  However,  the modest gross and the negative net job creation rates (i.e. the fall
in the overall number of jobs) suggests that more favorable  conditions  fro firm  entry and
expansion  are necessary to foster job creation  and achieve positive employment growth.
Job  creation  and job destruction  vary  depending  on firm  ownership,  region  and
industry.  This  variation  provides  important  policy  lessons,  which  will  be  examined
below.
Small  privatefirms:  the source of  labor market dynamics
As  one  would  have  expected,  the  public  sector  has  been  declining  while  the
private  sector  has  been  expanding  in  Bulgaria.  Accordingly,  in the  public  sector job
destruction exceeds job creation,  while the opposite  occurs in the private  sector, which is
the net creator of jobs (Table  17).  The job creation rate in the private sector is high, at 15
- 31 -percent,  over two times  as high  as in the public sector (6  percent).  The job destruction
rate  in  the private  sector  is also  high,  accounting  for  13  percent,  but lower than in the
public  sector,  which destroyed  over  15  percent of jobs in 2000.  Thus,  it is the private
sector  which  provides  job  opportunities,  while  the  down-sizing  of the  public  sector
contributes  to  unemployment.  Jobs  in  the  private  sector  are  often  precarious  (Kolev,
2002), but during the transition the public sector in Bulgaria offers even less job security.
Table 17  Job creation  and job destruction by public/private sectors,  2000
(as percent of total employment)
Sector  Job creation  Job destruction  Job turnover  Employment  Excess job
rate  rate  rate  growth rate  reallocation rate
Public  5.9  15.3  21.2  -9.4  11.8
Private  15.2  12.8  28.0  2.4  25.7
Source:  Survey of Employment and Wages, 2000, National  Statistical  Institute; Author's calculations
In  small  firms  the job  creation  rate  is  much  higher  than  in  large  firns.  For
example, the job creation rate in micro firms (which employ up to ten workers) is as high
as 27 percent,  while in large firms  it is only 2 percent (Table  18).13  In contrast,  the job
destruction rate does not vary much by firm size.  Micro  firms eliminate about  12 percent
of jobs  and large  firms  eliminate  some  10 percent  of jobs per year.  Consequently,  the
small firm sector is expanding and offering job opportunities,  while the large firm sector
is shrinking and shedding labor.  It should be stressed, that a particularly important role in
job creation is played by business start-ups.  Newly  established  firms created some one-
third of anl  new jobs  in 2000 (Figure  2).  This is more jobs than created by all  medium
and  large  firms  together!  The  fornation  of new  firms and the development  of existing
small  private  firms  are  thus  key  for  employment  growth  and  the  reduction  in
unemployment.
As noted, the rate of growth of new  firms has been relatively slow,  and the share
of small firrns  in  employment remains  low  in Bulgaria, which  explains why the  overall
rate of job creation  is not sufficiently high  and falls  short of the rate of job destruction.
The  new  sector,  comprising  of small  firmns,  has  not developed  yet  the  critical  mass  to
- 32 -generate  enough jobs to offset job losses  in the old sector.  Facilitating the entry of new
firms  and the  growth  of small enterprises  is hence a prerequisite  for  faster job creation,
employment  growth and eventually the reduction of unemployment.
Table 18  Job turnover by firm size,  2000
(percentages)
Job dstrucion  Jb tunover  Emploment  Excess job
Firm size  Job creation rate  Jobdestruction  Jobturnover  growth rate  reallocation
rate  rate  growth  rate  ~~~rate
Micro  27.0  12.2  39.2  14.9  24.3
Small  10.4  15.2  25.6  -4.8  20.8
Medium  5.2  17.3  22.5  -12.1  10.4
Large  2.1  10.2  12.3  -8.1  4.2
Note:
Micro:  1-10 employees
Small: 11-50  employees
Medium:  51-250 employees
Large: 251-1000 employees
Classification is based on the employment level in the initial year.
Source:  Survey of Employment and Wages,  2000, National Statistical Institute; Author's calculations
Figure 2 Job creation by firm size,  2000
(percentage  share)






Source:  Survey of Employment and Wages  2000, NSI, Author's calculations.
1  3  To some extent the high job creation rate in small firms reflects their low employment  level.
Accordingly,  large relative changes do not necessarily mean large absolute changes  in  employment.
- 33 -Regional  variation in job creation andjob destrmction
Job creation  and job  destruction  vary  visibly  - although  not  very strongly  - by
region,  which  points  to  regional  differentiation  of labor market  conditions  in Bulgaria
(Figure  3).14  In regions  with the best employment  opportunities (Sofia City, Varna  and
Burgas) the job creation  rate is at  12-13 percent.  In contrast, in depressed  regions which
provide  few  job  opportunities  (Sofia  district,  Lovetch,  Haskovo  and  Russe)  the  job
creation rate is around 9 percent.
The  variation  in job  destruction  is  much  less  than  in job  creation.  In  regions
which eliminate  the most jobs relative to their employment (Montana,  Russe,  Varna and
Burgas) the job destruction rate is  15  to  18  percent.  In regions which eliminate the least
jobs (Sofia City, Plovdiv) the job destruction rate is 12 percent, sill very high.
In  some regions  large job destruction  goes  hand in hand with  large job creation.
These are high turnover regions where workers  are able to  switch between jobs relatively
quickly.  Examples of high job tumover regions include Varna, Sofia City and Burgas.  In
contrast,  in some other regions  the labor market is more stagnant, with low job turnover.
In such regions  once a worker loses his/her job, he/she finds it difficult to find a new one.
Examples  of stagnant,  low job tumover  regions  include  the  Sofia  district,  Lovetch  and
Haskovo.
Job reallocation  in Bulgaria takes  place  largely within regions,  with very limited
reallocation  between  regions.  One  could  have  expected  that  during  the  course  of
economic transition job  reallocation  will occur  largely between regions  (and industries)
in order to redress  the inherited  spatial misallocation  of resources.  This  is not the  case,
however.  One reason is that - given that employment has declined in virtually all regions
- there is little  scope for regional job reallocation.15 Only when some Bulgarian regions
start to grow, this will create room for moving jobs from declining to expanding regions.
A new big challenge for the unemployed - to move across regions in search  for work - is
yet to come.
14  Regional differentiation  of labor mnarket conditions  and its sources are analyzed  in  Kotzeva (2002).
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Source:  Survey of Employment and Wages 2000, NSI, Author's calculations.
Expanding and declining industries
Industrial  restructuring  entails the decline  of old industries  and the expansion  of
new  industries.  In  Bulgaria  growing  industnes,  those  which  provide  the  best  job
opportunities,  include  the  so  called  "other  business  activities",  such  as  legal  services,
accounting,  business counseling,  marketing,  personnel recruitment,  etc.,  trade (wholesale
and  retail),  the  apparel  industry,  and  car  sale.  For  example,  employment  in  "other
business  activities"  increased  by  13  percent  in  2000  over  a previous  year  (Table 20A).
The  growth  of these  industries  reflects  the  transition  to  a  market  economy  and  thus  a
much  higher  share  of  services  in  the  economy,  Bulgaria's  comparative  advantage  in
international  trade  (the  apparel  industry),  as  well  as  increasing  standard  of living  (car
1  5  In addition, there exist various constraints  to cross-regional mobility such as cultural norms,
mobility costs (including the loss of social capital)  and an underdeveloped  housing market.
- 35 -sale).  These  industries  provide job opportunities  for both  highly  skilled,  white collar
workers and less skilled service and blue collar workers.
Table 19  Job turnover by industry, 2000
Percentages
A. Top 10 industries with  Job  B. Top 10 industries with  Job
highest rates of job creation  createon  highest rates of job destruction  desrauteion
Electricity, gas & hot water supply')  34.2  Forestry  38.3
Other business activities  23.8  Electricity, gas & hot water supply')  37.7
Wholesale trade  21.9  Health care2)  36.7
Car sale  17.3  Agriculture  21.1
Hotels & restaurants  17.1  Real estate  20.5
Retail trade  16.7  Transport equipment  18.7
Sewage & sanitation  16.4  Construction  17.7
Construction  16.3  Wood  17.1
Leather  16.1  Sewage & sanitation  16.6
Apparel  15.1  Machinery  16.1
C.  Top 10 industries with  Job  D.  Top  10 industries with  Employment
highest rates of job reallocation reallocation  highest rates of employment  growth rate rate  growth
Electricity, gas & hot water supply')  68.4  Other business activities  13.0
Sewage & sanitation  32.9  Wholesale trade  10.8
Construction  32.6  Apparel  6.5
Hotels & restaurants  30.9  Car sale  6.4
Real estate  28.9  Leather  5.1
Wood  28.1  Water (distribution)  4.0
Food  26.4  Retail trade  3.6
Retail trade  26.2  Public administration  1.9
Furniture  25.2  Publishing  1.8
Agriculture  23.8  Hotels & restaurants  1.6
1) High job turnover in this industry reflects administrative changes and is  largely spurious.
2) High job destruction in the health sector in large part reflects changes in the type of employment
relationship (employees  of medical centers turning into self-employed  GPs)  and is largely spurious.
Source:  Survey of Employment  and Wages,  2000, National  Statistical Institute; Author's calculations
Declining industries, where jobs  are at risk and their number is shrinking,  include
agriculture  and  forestry,  manufacturing  of transport  and machinery  equipment,  and  the
travel industry (Table  20B).  The magnitude of employment  reductions  in some of these
industries is indeed dramatic.  For example,  forestry decreased employment by about one-
third  over  a  year.  The  decline  of these  industries  reflects  economic  development
- 36 -(agriculture),  lack  of comparative  advantage  (some  manufacturing  branches),  and  the
downsizing of the inefficient public sector (education and health).
Job  opportunities  are  provided  not  only  in  expanding  industries  but  also  in
industries characterized by high job turnover.  These industries simultaneously  create and
close a large number of jobs, implying that the jobs they provide are often of a temporary
nature.  Nonetheless,  for many workers they offer a chance to enter the labor market and
gain work experience.  Such high turnover industries include  electricity and gas, sewage
and sanitation,  construction,  hotels and  restaurants,  food  industry,  and retail trade.  For
example,  in the  construction  industry,  over  16  percent  of jobs  were  reallocated  from
shrinking  firms  toward  expanding  firms  (Table  20C).  These  industries  create
employmnent  opportunities largely for manual, less skilled workers.
One would have  expected that  during the course  of economic  transition jobs are
being  reallocated  largely  between  industries,  as  this  gives  rise  to  the  change  in  the
industrial  employment  structure.  However  it turns out that this is no longer  the case in
Bulgaria,  i.e.  it  has  already  approached  the  equilibrium  industry  employment  structure,
when job reallocation takes place mainly within industries.  Specifically, in 2000 only 17
percent of jobs were reallocated  between industries,  while as much as 83  percent of jobs
were shifted from shrinking toward expanding  firms within an industry.
The  dominance  of the  within  industry  component  over  the  between  industry
component of job reallocations  is good news  from the  unemployment  perspective.  It is
presumably  easier  for  workers  who  lost  their jobs  to  find  a  new job within  the  same
industry, rather than in a different industry.  Skill requirements  are  similar across  firms
within  an  industry,  and  thus  the  problem of skill  mismatch  is likely  to be  less  severe
implying  limited  need  for  re-skilling  and  retraining.  Still,  the  between  industry
component  of job reallocation  is non-negligible,  which  means that a significant  fraction
of workers  who  lost  their jobs  in the  declining  industries  need  to  acquire  new  skills  in
order to find new jobs in the growing industries.
How does job turnover affect unemployment?
What  is the relationship  between job  turnover and unemployment?  Is higher job
- 37 -turnover associated with higher unemployment, but of shorter duration,  as claimed by the
theory  (Garibaldi  et al.  1996)?  Has  intense job reallocation  in  Bulgaria contributed  to
high  unemployment?  To answer  these  questions  we  first  analyze  correlations  between
job  creation,  destruction  and  unemployment  across  28  Bulgarian districts.  Second  we
discuss possible channels through which job turnover can affect unemployment.
The correlation analysis reveals a number of interesting  relationships  between job
creation and destruction, and regional labor market conditions (Table 20).
Table 20 (Correlations between job creation,  job destruction  and other  indicators of
labor market conditions in 28 districts, 2000
jc  id  egr  ejr  erate  urate  ltu  udur
jc  1.000
jd  -0.061  1.000
jt  0.702  0.669  1.000
egr  0.739  -0.717  0.039  1.000
ejr  0.969  0.108  0.799  0.603  1.000
erate  0.471  -0.666  -0.124  0.774  0.333  1.000
urate  -0.140  0.789  0.460  -0.626  -0.015  -0.837  1.000
Itu  0.087  0.204  0.210  -0.074  0.144  -0.300  0.255  1.000
udur  -0.487  0.529  0.015  -0.693  -0.395  -0.851  0.732  0.415
Variable description:
jc = job creation  rate; jd = job destruction  rate; jt = job  turnover rate;  egr = employment growth  rate;
ejr = excess job reallocation  rate; erate = employment-to-population  ratio;  urate = unemployment rate;
Itu  = long-term  unemployed  as a share of unemployment;  udur = average duration of unemployment  spells.
Note: correlations  are weighted  by the district's employment  level.
Source:  Author's calculations.
High job  creation  rate  is associated  with a high employment-to-population  ratio
and shorter unemployment duration.  However, surprisingly, by itself,  a high job creation
rate does not reduce unemployment.  This implies that while the working  age population
at  large benefits  from  greater  availability  of job  opportunities,  the  unemployed  do  not.
This may point to the skills gap, which prevents the unemployed to compete successfully
for jobs with other members of the  labor force.  This issue will be  explored  in the next
section.
Not surprisingly,  a high job destruction rate is associated with a low employment-
to-population  ratio, a high unemployment  rate, and longer unemployment  duration.  This
combined  with the previous finding indicates  that the unemployment  rate in  Bulgaria is
- 38 -strongly  affected  by  inflows  into  unemployment,  which  are  a  consequence  of job
destruction,  but is  not  affected by  the  rate  of job  creation  and  associated  employment
opportunities.  This  is  a  negative  phenomenon,  which  does  not  bode  well  for
unemployment  reduction in Bulgaria.
Expectedly,  it is the difference  between job creation  and job destruction rates (i.e.
the net job  creation rate)  that plays a critical role in determining labor market conditions.
A higher net job creation  rate  implies  higher employment  and  lower unemployment,  as
well as shorter duration of unemployment  spells.
In this context it is worth emphasizing that net job creation (employment  growth)
tends  to  be  higher  in  regions  undergoing  faster  restructuring.  There  is  a  significant
positive  correlation  between  regional  employment  growth  and  the degree  of enterprise
restructuring  as  measured  by  the excess job  reallocation  rate  (r=0.60).  It  is also  worth
stressing,  that  a  region's  employment  growth  depends  in  an  equal  measure  on  job
creation  (r=0.74)  as  on job  destruction  (r=-0.72).  This  suggests,  that  a  strategy  to
promote  sustainable regional  growth  should  focus  on  job  creation,  rather  than  on
preventing the destruction of unviable,  low productivity jobs.
Expectedly,  in high turnover  regional  labor markets (as  measured by excess job
reallocation  rate)  unemployment  duration tends  to  be shorter.  The  correlation  of these
two variables  is  pretty  strong  (0.60).  However,  contrary  to what  the theory  predicts,  a
high rate of job reallocation  does not seem  to contribute significantly  to unemployment.
In other words,  more intensive  enterprise  restructuring  does  not necessarily  give rise  to
higher unemployment.
Interestingly,  the share of long term unemployment  is virtually unaffected by job
turnover.  Specifically,  a high job creation rate  does not lower  long-term  unemployment.
A  large  fraction  of the  long-term  unemployed  can  exist  in  both  dynamic  and  stagnant
labor markets.  This seems  to  suggest that the  long-termn  unemployed  are left  out of the
labor market and  cannot benefit  from job opportunities  even if those are available.  If so,
this is a pessimistic finding.
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Moving  beyond the  regional analysis,  has enterprise restructuring  and associated
job  reallocation  contributed  to  high  unemployment  in  Bulgaria?  There  are  two
theoretical  reasons  for  the  answer  to  be  positive.  First,  in  the  short-run  high  job
reallocation  can  contribute  to  unemployment  due  to  the  increase  in  labor productivity.
Second,  given  the  heterogeneity  of jobs  and  workers,  high  job  reallocation  may
contribute  to frictional and structural unemployment.
Increase in labor productivity.  Enterprise  restructuring  is  associated  with  the
elimination of low productivity jobs and shedding of redundant labor.  Firms can produce
the  same  output  with  fewer  workers,  which  means  an  increase  in  labor  productivity.
However,  the  negative  effect  of  the  productivity  increase  achieved  through  labor
shedding  on  unemployment  is  of  a  short-term  nature.  In  the  longer  term  higher
productivity  results  in  lower  unit  labor  costs  and  thus  encourages  investment,  which
brings  about new jobs.'6 Another way of looking  at the  link between  productivity  and
unemployment  is  to  note  that  there  is  no  secular  trend  of increasing  unemployment,
which would have existed if rising productivity were causing joblessness.
Frictional and  structural unemployment.  Job  reallocation  means  that  the
displaced workers need to  search for new jobs,  which  takes time and requires  acquiring
information  on new job opportunities.  Moreover, jobs that have been  destroyed usually
differ  in  salient  characteristics  (e.g.  skills  required  to  perform  them,  or location)  from
those  which  have  been  created.  Workers  need  to  acquire  new  skills  or/and  move  to
different  locations  to  find  new  jobs.  Given  that  workers  are  not  perfectly  mobile,
structural  (skill  and spatial)  mismatches  arise.  That  is, job  reallocation  gives  rise to the
mismatch  between  the  skills  demanded  and  supplied  in  a  given  area,  or  causes  an
imbalance between the supplies of and demands for workers across  areas.  Frictional and
structural  unemployment  are  thus  an  unavoidable  consequence  of restructuring  and
associated reallocation of labor (Lilien,  1982, Abraham and Katz,  1986).
16  This  is  under the assumption that productivity gains are not fully consumed by higher wages but
instead improve the rate of return on tnvestments.
- 40 -These  theoretical  considerations  are  borne  out by  the  empirical  evidence.  For
example,  a recent study of the Polish labor market showed that an accelerated pace of  job
reallocation,  which occurred in the late  1990s, was accompanied  by a marked  increase in
unemployment  (World Bank, 2001).
Hence,  high unemployment  in Bulgaria  can  be attributed  to,  at  least  partly,  the
relatively  high  rate  of job  reallocation,  which  has  been  coupled  with  limitations  on
mobility  from old jobs to  new jobs.  However,  the high rate of job turnover  in Bulgaria
has coincided with long  average duration of unemployment,  which is not consistent with
theoretical  predictions.  In  theory,  high job turnover  should  improve  the  chances  of the
unemployed to find a new job, but in fact in Bulgaria it does not.
One  possible  explanation  is that  the  long  average  duration  of unemployment  is
due to a particular structure of  job turnover in Bulgaria, whereby job destruction exceeds
job creation.  In other words, high job turnover in Bulgaria has taken place in the context
of the overall  fall in the number of available jobs and an associated employment decline.
In addition (and not independently)  the decreased job availability has been  likely to lead
to  the  marginalization  of many  the  long-term  unemployed,  whose  employability  has
dramatically  diminished  due  to the  erosion of their skills  and morale.  Hence, the  long-
term unemployed in Bulgaria are hardly able to benefit from high job turnover.
To  conclude,  the  rate  of job  turnover  has  a  visible  impact  on  labor  market
conditions  in Bulgaria.  There  is evidence  - consistent with theoretical predictions  - that
higher job turnover  reduces  the duration of unemployment  spells.  However,  a disturbing
feature  of the relationship  is the asymmetric  reaction of regional  labor market conditions
to changes  in job creation  and in job destruction.  Unemployment  is highly sensitive  to
the rate of job destruction.  However,  it is virtually insensitive  to the rate of job creation.
An increase  in the rate of job destruction brings  about an increase  in the unemployment
rate  and  in  the  average  duration  of unemployment  spells.  In  a  strong  contrast,  an
increase  in the rate of job creation  by itself hardly lowers  unemployment,  and does not
reduce  the share  of long-term  unemployment,  although  tends  to  shorten  the job  search
duration.
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skills  necessary  to  successfully  compete  for  new  jobs.  These  new  jobs  often  differ
significantly  from  the  old jobs  as  regards  the  skill  content,  occupation  and  necessary
qualifications.  This problem is aggravated  by the long duration of unemployment  spells,
which  leads  to  the  erosion  of  skills  and  morale,  and  thus  further  undermines  the
effectiveness  of job  search  and  renders  the  long-term  unemployed  not  attractive  for
employers.  Labor market marginalization  seems  a serious problem  in Bulgaria,  limiting
the unemployment reduction potential of economic growth and job creation.
Policy implications
Labor market marginalization  is  a central  problem,  which however  is  not easily
amenable  to  policy  action.  There  are  few  policy  instruments  to  improve  the
employability  of  the  hard-core  long-term  unemployed  in  a  cost  effective  manner.
Training  may be  an  effective  solution  for  some  groups  of the  unemployed,  but  these
groups  and  their training needs  need  to be  precisely identified  and  assessed  in  order to
render program participation  effective.  In addition, training  in order to be effective needs
to be demand driven and geared to the needs of the employers.
The only sustainable way to reduce unemployment is to spur job creation so that it
exceeds  job  destruction.  Deterring  job  destruction  and  protecting  unviable,  low-
productivity jobs is not a way to proceed.  Instead  focus should be on encouraging  faster
job creation.  Key for  achieving  this are  a competitive  product  market  and  an enabling
business  environment.  It  has  been shown  that most  new jobs  are  created  by business
start-ups  and small firms.  By definition,  a competitive  product market is a market that is
contestable  and without barriers to entry.  Thus, fostering new entry entails removing any
existing obstacles  to competition.  Small firms  are particularly vulnerable  to bureaucratic
harassment,  overly  tight  regulations  and  high  taxation  (Beck  et  all.,  2002).  Therefore
fostering  their  growth calls  for  favorable business  environment,  deregulation,  including
labor market deregulation,  and less tax burden, including the reduction in payroll taxes.
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As  already  indicated,  some  of the  unemployed  lack  the  skills  necessary  to
compete successfully  for jobs  and find productive  employment.  Here  further  support is
provided  to  the  assertion  that  unemployment  in  Bulgaria  to  some  extent  reflects  poor
ability of the unemployed  to compete for new jobs.
The  skills  gap  on  the  part  of the unemployed  seems  to  partly  account  for  the
limited  transitions  from  unemployment  into jobs.  On  average,  the  unemployed,  and
especially the long-term unemployed,  have lower educational  attainment  and lower skills
than  the  employed  (Table  21).  In  other words,  there  is  an  "excess  supply"  of poorly
educated persons among the unemployed  in the sense that,  all else being equal,  there are
not enough low skilled jobs to eliminate unemployment. 17 Consequently,  unemployment
is  disproportionately  concentrated  among workers  with  low  educational  attainment  and
poor skills.  For example,  the  unemployment  rate  among  workers  with  less than  upper
secondary  education  is  over  30  percent  compared  with  less  than  ten  percent  among
workers with university  education.  Low or inadequate  skills are thus an important factor
behind high unemployment in Bulgaria.
Table 21  Employment  and unemployment  by educational attainment
(percentage  distribution)
Employed  Unemployed  "Excess  supply"
University  19.2  6.8  -12.4
College  7.2  3.4  -3.8
Secondary technical  22.7  19.6  -3.1
Secondary-vocational  16.2  16.9  0.6
Secondary general  16.5  16.5  0.0
Lower secondary  16.3  29.9  13.6
Primary or lower  1.8  6.8  5.0
Source:  Employment and Unemployment,  2/2001,  NSI, Sofia; Author's  calculations.
In  order  to assess  the  magnitude  of the  skills  gap,  let's  carry  out the  following
thought experiment.  Imagine  that  that  the number of available jobs  grows  to  the point
where  there  are  enough  jobs  for  all  of the  unemployed.  Assume  that jobs  for  each
17  A critical variable that here is assumed to be constant is the structure of wages.  A flexible  wage
structure, entailing the  fall in relative wages of low skilled workers,  would in theory help to absorb
unemployment  among poorly educated workers.  However, social norms embedded inter alia in the mnnimum
wage, prevent wages from adjusting to supply and demand conditions.
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employment  by  education.'8 Assume  also  that  skill  mismatch  occurs  only between
educational  levels.  i.e.  there are no skill  mismatches within educational  levels.19 Under
such  a  best-case  scenario,  where  the  number  of vacancies  equals  the  number  of job
seekers,  some 20 percent of  all unemployed  will not find a job because of the skills gap,
that is,  because their skills fall short of employer  requirements.20 Expectedly, the extent
of the  skill gap  is more pronounced  among the  long-term  unemployed  than among the
short-term unemployed.  Given the current rate of unemployment of about  19 percent, the
estimated  skills  gap  implies  four  percent  unemployment  rate  caused  by  the  skill  gap.
This is a lower bound estimate due to optimistic assumptions underlying  the calculations.
In  reality,  the  problem  of the  skill  gap  and  skill  mismatch  is  likely  to  be  still  more
pronounced.
The  data  suggest  that  the  skill  gaps  has  increased  somewhat  since  mid  1990s,
when it was at  17 percent.21  Although  the increase is not large, the negative  direction of
the  change  is  worrisome.  If the  skills  gap  has  indeed  increased,  then  this  limits  the
prospects for unemployment  reduction,  as the skills gap is hardly amenable to short-term
policy interventions.  While training may help to address the problem of skill mismatches
and  complement  existing  skills,  it is much  less  efficient  in  bridging the  skills  gap (see
below for recommendations).
The inadequate skills of the unemployed,  especially of the long-term unemployed,
are  likely  to  be  an  important  factor  behind  relatively  limited  outflows  from
unemploymnent  to  work  in Bulgaria.  Poor  skills  prevent  a  substantial  fraction  of the
unemployed  to effectively  compete for jobs, and can lead to their marginalization  on the
18  This is  an optimiistic scenario,  since in reality due to  the skill biased technological  change high skilled
jobs grow at a faster pace than low skilled jobs.
19  This is again an optimistic assumption as after all skill mismatches  do exit within educational groups.
L
20  The formula to calculate  the skill gap is: sg =  E  (u. - e.)  for u, > e,, where ui and e,  are
t=1
percentage  shares of the z-th educational level in unemployment and employment, respectively,  and L is the
number of educational levels.
21  Rutkowski (1999)
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low rate  of exit  from  unemployment  to  work  attests  that  the  unemployed  in  Bulgaria
often  lose  in  the  competition  for  new  jobs  with  those  who  already  have  jobs.  The
unemployed  account  for  only 40  percent  of new  hires,  while  the rest  is accounted  for
persons  who  change jobs  (40  percent),  and new  entrants  to  the  labor  market.  In  other
words,  there  is  some  evidence  that  employers  prefer  to  hire  from  the ranks  of already
employed  rather than  from the ranks of the unemployed,  whom they tend to perceive  as
less productive.
The  apparent  importance  of the  skills  mismatch  and  gap  problem  in  Bulgaria
points  to  the  role  of the educational  and training  systems  in addressing  the  problem  of
low, narrow and inadequate  skills.  It should be emphasized that while the training system
can address  the problem of inadequate skills at the margin,  the educational  system needs
to  play  a  much  more  fundamental  role  in producing  not  so  much  trained  as  trainable
workers.  That is workers  who are  first of all  capable of permanent learning  and  able to
acquire  new skills  in response to  ever changing job  requirements.  Thus,  building  an
adequate  human  capital  should  be  perceived  as  part  and  parcel  of  an  effective
employment policy.
2.4  Legal  Constraints to Labor Market Flexibility
This sub-section  looks  at regulatory  constraints  faced  by employers  in Bulgaria
which may negatively  affect the rate of job creation.  The focus is on the Labor Code,  a
recently revised basic  legal document which governs industrial  relations.
The  issue  of the  statutory  minimum  wage  is  also  addressed,  as  by  possibly
limiting wage  adjustment  it may negatively affect  the creation  of low-productivity jobs.
The sub-section  starts by briefly describing the existing legal  framework  for employment
22  The rate ofjob-to-job movements means  10 percent of workers who  were employed in March
2000 were in a different job one year later.  This rate  is high compared with other transition economies.
For example in Lithuanma  and Poland job-to-job movements are of the order of 5-6 percent, and are thus
smaller than in Bulgaria  in both absolute  terms and  in relation to movements  form unemployment to
employment.  The relatively high rate of job-to-job transitions  means that employers prefer to fill in
existing vacancies  by bidding away workers  from other jobs, rather than hiring the unemployed.  This
suggests that the unemployed  in Bulgaria are marginalized,  more so than in Lithuania and Poland.
- 45 -and wage protection,  and comparing it with that in selected transition  economies.  Next, it
recommends  some measures  to improve  labor market  flexibility.  The analysis  indicates
that regulatory  barriers  to labor  market  flexibility  are moderate  in Bulgaria,  broadly  in
line  with  those  in  other  transition  economies. 23 Nonetheless,  in  some  important
dimension labor market flexibility can be enhanced.
The recent (as of March 2001) revisions to the Labor Code were meant to adjust it
to the  needs of a market  economy and  improve  labor  market  flexibility.  As  such they
were  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  However,  the  changes  did  not  address  all  of the
rigidities inherited from the socialist past  and thus labor market flexibility in some areas
remains  limited.  Further  labor  market  reforms  are  necessary  in  order  to  tackle  to  the
country's  acute unemployment problem.
Main indicators  of the strictness of employment  protection regulation  in Bulgaria
and  in selected transition economies  of CEE are presented  in Annex  2.  The comparison
suggests  that in  general  employment  protection  legislation  is not unduly restrictive.  Its
positive side includes relatively low monetary costs of dismissals (short  advanced  notice
and  low  mandatory  severance  pay),  and  an  option to  redistribute  working hours,  which
gives employers  flexibility in adjusting labor input to fluctuations  in product demand.  In
some  areas,  however,  existing  legislation  excessively  restrains  employers  freedom  to
adjust the size and composition of their workforce to changing  economic conditions, with
possibly negative consequences for firm performance.  These areas include:
Procedural  costs of dismissal 24. Employers complain that laying-off a worker due
to  poor performance,  lack  of skills,  misconduct  or redundancy  is difficult  in  Bulgaria.
Part of this is reflects  employment protection  provisions of the Labor Code, another part
reflects  a pro-labor bias exhibited by courts.  The Labor Code does not mention economic
23  Among the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe the most rigid labor markets exist
in  countries which constituted former Yugoslavia.  Agamst this benchmark,  labor market in  Bulgaria
moderately rigid.  However  it is less flexible than in  Estonia, which epitomizes a transition economy with a
flexible labor market.
24  Procedural costs of dismissal relate to adrministrative,  legal and judicial procedures necessary to
carry out a valid dismissal.  They should be distmguished  from monetary costs of dismissal (such as
severance pay).  However lengthy and difficult administrative  procedures  mvolve an opportunity cost and
eventually translate  into monetary costs borne by the employer.
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addition,  it lists conditions  for poor performance  or misconduct which are difficult to be
met in practice.  Courts in turn tend to declare dismissals invalid, and order reinstatement
and/or payment of compensation.  All this renders dismissals  difficult,  especially in firms
with  strong  union  presence.  These  procedural  costs,  which  make  it  difficult  for
employers  to  fire  redundant  labor in  the  period  of downtum,  discourage  hiring in  the
period  of  upturn.  This  is  because  employers  do  not  want  to  be  locked  into  an
unprofitable relationship and try to avoid future costs associated with redundancies.
Strict limitation on  the  use  of fixed-term  employment  contracts.  Fixed-term
contracts in Bulgaria are allowed only for work which  is temporary or seasonal  in nature,
and can  be  renewed  only  once.  This  explains  their limited  incidence  and  is  likely to
contribute to  limited hiring.  As in the earlier case, if employers cannot easily adjust the
size and composition of their workforce  according to business needs,  then they resort to
less hiring.  Restrictions  on  the use of fixed  term  contracts  hurt especially  employment
chances of less productive  workers  (e.g. those with little labor market experience  or low
skills), that is exactly those workers who are most stricken by unemployment.
Restrictions  on the use and high costs of overtime work.  The use of overtime is in
principle  prohibited  in  Bulgaria  except  in  emergency  situations  and  in  the  case  of
intensive seasonal  work.  In addition,  the Labor Code imposes  a tight  yearly limit of 150
overtime  hours (for comparison  in Hungary  the limit can be twice as large).  The use of
overtime is also costly for employers as they have to pay an overtime premium of at least
50 percent  of the base  wage.  These  restrictions  limit the ability of employers to  adjust
the  volume  of production  to  fluctuations  in demand.  However,  on a  positive  side  and
partly  offsetting  these  limitations  there  is  a  provision  which  allows  employers  to
redistribute  working hours within a period of one  quarter,  i.e.  to lengthen working hours
during peak demand and shorten them proportionately when demand is low.  Still, greater
working  time  flexibility  would  help  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  Bulgarian
enterprises.
Limitations on wage adjustments.  According  to  the  Labor  Code  employers  are
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to changing demand conditions.  While the intention of this provision has been to protect
worker  earnings,  it  actually  is  likely  to  hurt  workers  by  compelling  the  employer  to
reduce employment rather than wages during the period of depressed demand.
In  addition,  limitations  on wage  adjustment  come from  the  statutory  minimum
wage.  Until  recently  the  minimum  wage  was  low  relative  to  the  average  wage,  thus
hardly  hurting  employment  opportunities  of low  skilled  and  inexperienced  workers.
However  the  minimum  wage  was  raised  in  October  2001,  which  increased  its  "bite".
Currently the minimum wage is at around 38 percent of the average wage.25 At this level
it may limit employment opportunities of less skilled and less experienced workers in the
depressed  regions  of the  country.  It should  be noted  that the minimum  wage is not an
effective  anti-poverty tool,  as often minimum wage  workers are  young persons  who are
secondary earners  in non-poor families.  At the same time too high of a minimum wage
hurts the poor, whose productivity is often low, by locking them out of employment.
Policy recommendations
The removal of the above mentioned limitations on labor market flexibility can be
expected  to  foster job  creation  and  hiring,  and  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of
Bulgarian  firms.  In particular,  the  following measures  have  the  potential of improving
labor market performance  in Bulgaria:
o  . Lowering  procedural  costs  of  dismissal  by  explicitly  listing  economic,
technological and organizational considerations  as valid reasons for a lay-off;
o  Easing  the  restrictions  on  the  use  of  fixed-term  contracts  by  lifting  the
provision  whereby  fixed-term  contracts  can  be  renewed  only  once,  while
imposing a limit on their cumulative duration;
o  Improving working  time flexibility  by removing  the provision  that prohibits
25  The ratio of the rnimmum wage to the average wage may be overestimated  due to conimon
underreporting of wages in Bulgaria (which implies that the average wage - the denominator - is
underestimated).  If in fact the ratio is significantly lower than the one shown above, then the mninimum
- 48 -overtime  work,  substantially  increasing  the  yearly  limit of overtime  hours
(while keeping the daily limit for health and safety reasons);
*  Limiting  the increase  in the statutory  minimum wage  (relative  to the median
wage)  so  as  not  to  discourage  hiring  of  low  skilled  workers  in  depressed
regions of the country.
III.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Unemployment  in  Bulgaria  is  high  and  of  long  duration.  High  inflows  into
unemployment  coincide  with  limited  outflows.  Enterprises  shed  redundant  labor  and
curb  hiring.  Workers  face  a high  risk  of losing  their job,  while  facing  low chances  of
finding new employment.
High inflows into unemployment  are caused  by intensive enterprise  restructuring.
Jobs are  reallocated  away  from low-productivity  uses in declining  firms, toward  higher-
productivity  uses  in  expanding  firms,  with  resulting  productivity  gains.  Higher
productivity implies  that, given the level of output, firms need  less labor and thus lay-off
redundant workers.
Outflows  from  unemployment  are  low  due  to  three  main  factors.  First,  the
insufficient growth of new firms limits job opportunities.  The share of new small private
firms  in  employment  is  in Bulgaria  substantially  lower  than  in  leading  reformers,  and
barely  above  the empirical  threshold  of 40 percent,  which  indicates  critical  mass of the
new  sector necessary  for sustainable  economic  growth.  The relatively  small  size of the
new  sector  points  to  barriers  to  entry  and  inhibiting  business  environment  given  that
macroeconomic  conditions  have  been  favorable  following  the  introduction  of  the
stabilization package in  1997.
Second,  labor  market  rigidities  impede  hiring.  In  general,  the  labor market  in
Bulgaria  is  relatively  flexible  and  existing  constraints  to  flexibility  are  modest,  as
witnessed by a relatively high rate of job turnover.  However,  some regulations  are likely
wage at its current level is less likely to be a binding constraint and have  a discermible  negative impact on
employment.
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strict restrictions  on contingent  (e.g.  fixed-termn)  employment contracts.  High dismissal
costs  render  employers  reluctant  to  hire  new  workers  during  the period  of economic
upturn since they know that it will be costly to fire them during the period of downturn.
The minimum wage may also have a detrimental  effect on hiring and employment of low
skilled and inexperienced workers in the economically depressed regions of the country.
Third,  intensive enterprise restructuring has  created  skill and spatial  mismatches.
New jobs which  are  being  created differ with  respect  to salient characteristics  from the
old jobs which are being eliminated.  This makes the transition  from old job to new jobs
difficult  for  some  categories  of workers,  especially  those  with  low,  narrow  or  non-
portable  skills.  Consequently,  many workers  who lost their jobs cannot  find new  ones.
In  additions,  the  longer  they  remain  jobless,  the  more  difficult  is  for  them  to  get
employed  as  their  skills  and  motivation  erode,  and  employers  are  reluctant  to  hire
workers with long unemployment  history.
How  can  unemployment  be  lowered?  There  is  no  single  measure  that  taken
separately can bring about reduction in unemployment.  However  a package of measures
can contribute to fostering job creation and thus to the reduction of unemployment.  Such
a package should focus on three broad areas:
First, priority should be  given to improving business environment.  Any existing
barriers  to  entry  and  constraints  to  growth  of existing  firms  should  be  removed  to
encourage  the  development  of  the  new  more  productive  sector  of  the  economy.
Developing  a friendly business  environment  comprises  creating transparent  rules  of the
game,  deregulation,  less discretionary power for bureaucrats,  lower level of business  and
labor taxation.
Second,  the  labor  market  should  be  further  reforrned  to  improve  flexibility.
Reforms should be based on three principles:  (a)  deregulation  of labor relations through
changes to the Labor Code; (b)  devolution of the responsibility  for determining the labor
relations  to  social  partners,  which  entails  adequate  and  genuine  representation  of
- 50 -employers  and  employees  in  social  dialogue,  and  (c)  decentralization of  collective
bargaining by strengthening  firm level bargaining.
Third,  educational  and  training  systems  should  be  improved  to  address  the
problem  so the  skills  gap  and  skill mismatches.  While  the  education  system should  be
reformed  with  a  view  of providing  broad  labor  market  skills  to  all  students,  training
should  be targeted at selected  worker  groups with well  identified  iabor market  problems
and tailored to the needs of employers.
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Description of the Labor Force Survey
The Labor Force  Survey (LFS)  is carried out  quarterly by the National Statistical
Institute.  The LFS data are collected from a nationally wide and representative sample of
population  of persons  aged  15  and  over,  living  in  non-institutional  households.  The
sample  includes  24 000 households.  It  is  a sub  sample of the master sample that covers
10%  of the  enumeration  districts  defined  in  1992  Population  Census.  The  complex
stratified  two-staged  cluster  approach  was  applied  for  sample  selection.  The  sample  is
stratified  into  urban  and  rural  regions  and  in  each  stratum  a new  stratification  by 28
regions  is applied.  The primary  unit of clustering  is the  enumeration  district and  at  the
first stage 2000  enumeration districts are selected with the probability proportional  to the
size  of the  population living  in the district.  At the  second  stage  in each of the  selected
districts  12  households  are  chosen  by  systematic  approach.  The  constant  number  of
households  in  each  enumeration  district  ensures  equal burden  of the  interviewers.  The
survey is run on rotating principle and the attrition rate is 50 percent, which means that 12
of the  households  stay  in  two  consecutive  survey  waves.  In  one  wave  about  50  000
persons aged  15  and over, living in 24000 households are  interviewed.
The questionnaire  on informal sector  activities was attached  to the LFS in March
2001  and covered 1000 households or 2267 persons aged  15  and over. The sub sample of
1000  households  was  randomly  selected  from  the  main  LFS  sample,  preserving  the
regional proportions and the proportion  urban-rural locations.
To reduce  problems associated with non-response, the principle of replacement  of
the non-respondent with a look-alike living in the same district was applied.  As a results
the  response  rate  was  98%  and  2269  questionnaires  were  available  for  further  data
processing and analysis.
In order to  analyze labor force transitions one can use two options.  One  is to use
a retrospective question included in the module of infonnal  sector activities in the March
2001 wave of the survey, which was answered by 2253 persons.  The attachment contains
- 54-question  asking respondents what was their labor market status one. year ago (at the end
of March 2000).
The  second  option  is  to construct  a  panel  using  data  from  the  two  consecutive
waves of LFS: March  and June  2001.  Such a panel covers all the persons  who took part
in the two surveys. After data cleaning the matched sample includes 23000 persons.
The  main methodological  difference  between  the two approaches  consists  of the
way  of determining  the  labor status..  In  the  March  -June  2001  panel  the  labor  force
status  of the  respondents  was  determined  following  the standard  ILO  methodology.  In
contrast,  in  the  March  2001  survey  one's  labor  force  status  one  year  earlier  was
determined  based  on  respondent's  self categorization,  with  the  choice  limited  to  the
following  categories:  employed,  self-employed,  student,  housewife,  pensioner,  soldier,
unemployed,  and  other.  Such an  approach  was  likely to result in the overestimation  of
the number of unemployed  and underestimation of the number of persons out of the labor
force in March 2000.  This is because people who report that they are unemployed  but are
not actively  looking  for work  or are  not  available  for work should be,  according  to the
ILO  methodology,  categorized  as  out  of the  labor  force,  rather  than  unemployed.  In
consequence,  the magnitude of flows from  unemployment  to inactivity  (out of the labor
force) is likely to be overestimated.
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Description  of the Survey of Employment and Wages
The National Statistical Institute  carries  out an annual survey of employment and wages.
This  survey  was  a primary source  for  the  analysis of job  creation  and job  destruction.
The main characteristics  of the survey are as follows.
Firm Coverage
The survey  is a census of all registered  enterprises  which are subject  to VAT and  apply
double-entry  accounting  standards.  The  survey  also  covers  non-business  sector,  e.g.
public  administration,  education  and  health  care  units.  Excluded  are  sole-proprietor
firms.  In  2000 the data set of firms which responded  to the survey comprised of 52721
firms.
Worker Coverage
All  employees  regardless  of  their  employment  status  (including  part-time  workers,
temporary workers,  etc.).
Definition of employment
Employment  =  total  employment  in  the  firm  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of the
calendar  year.  Employment  in  budgetary  units  (e.g.  schools,  medical  centers,  etc.)  is
aggregated at the municipality level.
Firm entry and exit
Firm entry and exit is generally difficult to determine by means of a survey.  In this study
a convention was adopted whereby
entry (business start up) is defined as follows:
E(t) = 0 and E(t+1) > 0, and
exit (business closure) is defined as follows:
E(t) > 0 and E(t+l) = 0
where  E(t)  stands  for  employment  at  time  t.  and  0 means  either  missing  data  or  zero
employment level (those two are undistinguishable  in the survey data).
- 56-It should be noted due to data limitations information on firm entry and exit is likely to be
biased.  In particular,  the number of business closures  is  likely to  be underestimated,  as
firms which closed during the reporting year do not respond to the survey.  The number
of business start-ups may be over-estimated as a lack of information on initial (beginning
of the reporting year) employment level does not necessarily  imply that the firm was not
operating  at  that  time.  Accordingly,  data  on  firm entry  and  exit  are  approximate  and
should be treated with necessary caution.
Data Cleaning
In  a  few  cases  matched  employment  records  showed  implausibly  large  increases  or
decreases  in firm  employment  over a year.  Such large employment changes are likely to
reflect either mergers, or splits, or can be spurious, i.e., reflect errors in data entry.  Given
that such outliers  have  a large weight  and bias the data on job creation and  destruction,
they  were  removed  from  the  data  set.  An observation  was  treated  as  an  outlier if the
employment  change  was  large  in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms.  A  large  absolute
change  was defined as that exceeding three  standard deviations.  A large relative change
was  defined  as  one  exceeding  33%  increase/decrease  in  the  employment  level  over  a
year.
Basic  statistics  referring  to  the  original  data  set  and  the  cleaned  data  set  (used  for
analysis) are shown in Table Al.
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Firm category  No. of firms  Employment  Change in employment
(as  of  |(January-December  2000A
December  Standard
2000)  Mean  deviation
A.  OrIginna  data set
Openings  3978  99010  24.9  113.3
Continuing  47123  1632844  -2.2  42.5
Closures  1409  0  -60.3  176.0
No data  211  0  0  0
AUI  firms  52721  1731854  -1.7  59.7
13.  Ceieamed data set
Openings  3945  64757  16.4  34.8
Continuing  46967  1570708  -1.5  19.9
Closures  1382  0  -40.0  72.0
All firms  52294  1635465  -1.1  25.4
No data = missing values on both beginning and end of the year employment.
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Indicators of the strictness of employment  protection  regulations,  2001
Bulgaria  Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania  Poland
A.  Individual dismissal
Conditions for fair  Lack  of skills  &  poor  Non-performance  or business  Non-performance  or  Business  needs, non-  Lack of competence,
dismissal  performance,  disciplinary  needs  business  needs  performance,  inadequate  redundancy of the job
reasons.  Business needs  are  skills, disciplinary  reasons.
not clearly sated as a
condition justifying
dismissal.
Mutual agreement  with compensation amounting to  least 4 monthly salaries.  Mutual agreement with compensation  rangmg from 6
months salary (tenure<lyears) to 36 months salary
(tenure>20  years)
Advanced  notice  Unrelated  to tenure  Related to tenure  Related  to tenure  Unrelated to tenure  Related to tenure
Mmimum  30 days  (indefinite duration  2 months  30 days  2 months  2 weeks
contract)
Maximum  3 months (fixed-term  4 months (if tenure  more  than  90 days  4 months  (workers with  3 months
contracts)  10 years)  children,  workers 5 years
before  retirement, disabled,
etc.)
Severance pay  Not related  to job tenure  Related to employer tenure  Related to employer tenure
Minimum  I month salary  2 months  I month (tenure <5 years)  I month  salary  None,  but  1 month in case
of termination  due to
disability or retirement
Maximum  I month salary  4 months salary  6 months (tenure>25  years) 3 months salary
12 months  for civil  servantsBulgaria  Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania  Poland
Monetary  compensation in  Forgone  earmings up to  6  Up to 6 months wages  Severance  pay is doubled  Forgone earnings up to  12  Forgone earrungs up to two
case of unfair dismissal  months salary  and extended to those  months salary  months plus compensation
below 3 years of tenure  up to 3 rnonths salary
B.  Collective dismissals
Minimum number of workers  not defined  Not regulated  legislatively  10 workers  10 workers withun 30 days  10% of workers in firms
constituting collective  employing less than  1,000
dismissal  workers within 30 days
Obligatory notification,  none  Notification of workers'  Consultations with trade  information sent to local  Consultations with trade
consultations, or approval  representatives  unions or works councils;  government and local labor unions, notification  of
notification of local  office  local labor office
employment office.
Delay to start of notice and  none  Not regulated legislatively  30 days  Notificatnon of local labor  45 days (elaborate)
additional notice period  office 3 months prior to
____  ____  ____  ____  ___  lplanned  dismiissal
90 days if 25%  of workforce or 50+ employees are involved
Type of negotiations  required (number of workers, selection  Not regulated legislatively  Consultations on planned  Attempt of redeployment  is Agreement  on the number
cnteria, redeployment,  retraining, outplacement,  severance  reductions  and ways to  a precondition for  of workers to be dismissed
pay,  etc.)  mitigate  its effects  dismissal  and selection critena.  If
agreement cannot be
reached,  the ultimiate
decision is with
management..
Severance pay  No special regulations  No  special  regulations  for No  special  provisions  for Related  to  total  length  of
collective dismissals  collective  dismissals  service
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Minimum  I month (less than 10
years)
Maximum  3 month (more than 20
years)
Fixed  term contracts
Limitations  on use  Only in the case of temporary  Objective reason (list of 6  No restrictions expect for  Only  in the case of work  No restrctions
or seasons work; otherwise in  permussible reasons)  public service (objective  that is temporary  in nature
exceptional cases  reason only)
Maximum number of  I  No limit specified  No limit specified  2 (plan is to decrease to 1)  2
successive contracts




Lirrutations  on use (other  Prohibited except for  Special business needs;  Special business needs
than protection  of women,  emergency and intensive  worker's consent required
minors, etc.)  seasonal works
Yearly limit (hours)  150  200  200; up to 300 if agreed in  120  150
collective  bargaining
Overtime premuum  50% of  base salary during  at least 50% of base salary  50% of base salary  at least 50% of base salary  50% of base salary for two
weekdays,  75% on  weekends  first hours;l00%  for
ensuing  hours
Redistribution of working  Possible within 4 moths  By agreement of parties  Possible within one year  Possible within 4 months  Not provided  for
hours  period
Collective bargaining
Dominant bargaining levels  Firm/Industry  National (mostly bargaining  Firm  Firm  Firm
over minimum wage)
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Mandatory  extensions of  In exceptional cases by MoL  No  No  No  No
industry level agreements  to
non-participattng  firms
Statutory minimum wage  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Determned by  Government  Government;  proposal  Government through  Government; proposal  Govermment,  based on
submutted by tree-partite  negotiations with trade  submitted by tree-partite  proposal submitted by
council  unions  council  tripartite council.
Regular periodical  ad hoc  adjustment  Negotiated  Regular yearly adjustment  Periodtcal adjustments  Yes
adjustment for changes in
costs of living
Percentage  of the average  around  33 until Q4 2001,  Around 30  Around 30% until 2001  Around 40  around 40
wage
around 38 since Q4  2001  40% since January 2001
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook 1999, National legislation and regulations.
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